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Abstract
NOPPHOL WITVORAPONG: The Dynamics of Living Arrangements Among
the Elderly.
(Under the direction of Donna B. Gilleskie.)
Combining care arrangements and whom the elderly live with, I study the mechanisms
behind changes in living arrangements. I estimate a dynamic model of living arrangements,
savings, intergenerational transfers and health outcomes. I use the discrete factor random
effects estimation method to control for unobserved heterogeneity. I use the rich data available
in the 1995-2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and supplement them
with data on Medicaid and costs of care, resulting in a unique dataset. I find that living
arrangements are strongly influenced by health and savings. In particular, functional health
is the strongest predictor of living arrangements. Inter vivos transfers and bequest intent
affect living arrangements only to the extent that they impact the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity, indicating the absence of the exchange hypothesis as far as living arrangements
are concerned. Public policies have a small but significant effect in the determination of living
arrangements. For example, a twofold increase in the probability of receiving nursing home
benefits among Medicaid eligibles increases the use of nursing home only by a 0.1 percentage
point. The effects of public policies are more pronounced among elderly individuals with poor
initial health and low initial wealth.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
That the elderly move from living independently to living in an intergenerational household
to institutionalization is well documented in the literature, yet the mechanisms behind the
switch from one living arrangement to another (and back) are not well understood. The decline
in intergenerational coresidence and its replacement by independent living and nursing home
entry in the last half of the twentieth century have not been extensively studied (Grabowski,
2001). Also, the association between whom the elderly live with and the type of care they
receive has become increasingly blurred. In 2004, according to a study by the National Center
for Health Statistics, 75.9% of elderly individuals who needed care lived with their children or
relatives and received informal care. The rest either had other living arrangements, received
professional care or lived with their children but did not receive informal care. The NCHS
study implies a changed definition of intergenerational coresidence and that it should no longer
be treated as synonymous with informal care provision. It is important to understand that
the elderly decide on their living and care arrangements jointly.
The literature has highlighted two important determinants of living arrangements: health
and wealth (Bowers, 1988; Boersch-Supan et al., 1990; Hurd, 1990; Hoerger et al., 1996; Costa,
1997; Schoeni, 1998; Michael et al., 2001). While the elderly may prefer living independently,
their health (hence their care requirement) might not accommodate it. Living with adult
children or in a nursing home minimizes the transaction costs of care provision and increases
the efficiency of care production relative to living alone. The fact that nursing home care
(costing an average of $70,912 annually in 2006, according to a report published by Genworth
Financial) can take up a large percentage of the elderly’s wealth may induce them to choose
a different, cheaper option, holding health constant. Another factor that could be important
in determining the household formation outcome is the elderly’s tendency to make monetary
transfers (Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Heiss et al., 2003). Monetary assistance from elderly
parents to adult children can manipulate the source of care the elderly receive and therefore
their care arrangement. The theory of exchange proposed by Bernheim et al. (1986) argues
that informal care by adult children can be elicited through inter vivos transfers (monetary
assistance while the parents are alive) and/or a promise of bequests (a transfer after the
parents die). If transfers are large or frequent enough, they could result in an intergenerational
coresidence arrangement. Clearly, the decision to choose one living arrangement over others,
wealth and health outcomes and the elderly’s transfer behavior are interrelated.
Other factors also affect the availability and costs of care faced by the elderly. According
to the US Census Bureau, the elderly population grew by a factor of 11 during 1900-1994
and the household size shrank by one body per a 100 million increase in citizens. The decline
in fertility and mortality rates in the US indicates that the average burden of elderly care
on adult children has increased. Rising opportunity costs of time for female adult children
who typically are caregivers (due to more education and a narrowing male-female wage gap)
means the cost of informal care borne by adult children has increased. This allows what
had been family functions to be replaced by market provisions, such as home health aides or
retirement communities. The government has attempted to alleviate the cost of informal care
borne by informal caregivers as well as the costs of formal and nursing home care faced by
the elderly. Through public programs such as employer accommodation laws (e.g. the Family
and Medical Leave Act (1993)) and the provision of tax incentives for informal caregivers, the
burden of informal care on adult children decreases, increasing the likelihood of informal care
arrangements. Through the provision of home and community based services (HCBS) which
include, for instance, respite care, payment for visits by home health professionals and the
coverage of nursing home costs by the means-tested Medicaid program, the costs of formal
home care and nursing home care faced by qualified elders decline. These social phenomena
and public programs have the potential to encourage the elderly to substitute away from one
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living arrangement toward another.
That the elderly make their living arrangement decision contemporaneously with their
wealth and health outcomes as well as their transfer decision, and that these decisions/outcomes
are affected by public programs, most prominently Medicaid, imply that, to uncover the mech-
anisms behind household formation, these decisions/outcomes need to be studied jointly and
Medicaid needs to be incorporated. Time-invariant and time-varying unobserved heterogene-
ity can produce misleading results unless properly accounted for. For example, an elderly
individual with an unobserved preference for an informal care living arrangement may have
very different saving and transfer behaviors than one with an unobserved preference for a for-
mal home care living arrangement, given the same health outcome and comparable personal
characteristics.
I have three main goals in this research. First, I attempt to better understand the mecha-
nisms behind how the elderly switch in and out of a living arrangement, or more specifically,
to identify important factors of living arrangements. Second, I assess the impact of inter-
generational transfers on living arrangements and see if there is evidence for the exchange
hypothesis at the household level as opposed to the child level at which it is usually studied.
Finally, I evaluate and quantify the impact of public policies, particularly Medicaid, on living
arrangements and come up with policy implications.
I model living arrangements, savings, intergenerational transfers and health outcomes
jointly using the nonlinear discrete factor random effects estimation method to control for
unobserved heterogeneity and minimize endogeneity bias. I also estimate married households
and unmarried households separately in some of the equations to account for the importance
of having a spouse. I use the rich data available in the 1995-2006 waves of the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) and supplement them with my own research and my correspondences
with state Medicaid offices, resulting in a unique dataset.
Estimates from the analysis suggest that living arrangements are strongly influenced by
health and savings, and functional health is the most predominant predictor of living arrange-
ments. Intergenerational transfers in the form of inter vivos transfers and expressed intention
to leave a bequest upon death affect living arrangements only to the extent that they impact
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the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Public policies play a role in the determination
of living arrangements. Their effects are small but significant. For example, a twofold increase
in the probability of receiving nursing home benefits among Medicaid eligibles increases the
probability of using nursing home by only a 0.1 percentage point. The effects of public policies
are more pronounced among elderly individuals with poor health and low wealth.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a liter-
ature review. In Chapter 3, I present a simple theoretical model of household formation as a
decision made by elderly parents. In Chapter 4, I present an empirical model motivated by the
theory and explain the discrete factor random effects estimation method in detail. In Chapter
5, using the multiple waves and cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study, I explain how
the final sample is constructed and show descriptive statistics of important variables. I present
my results in Chapter 6 and conclude in the final chapter.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Living Arrangements, Health and Wealth
Living arrangement is an important decision that the elderly face. The decision includes
not only with whom the elderly live but also the type of care they may receive. Possible living
arrangements are 1) living in a community, which may or may not entail care, and 2) living
in an institution or a nursing home, which certainly includes care. Modes of community living
range from living independently (i.e., living by oneself or living with one’s spouse), to living
with adult children, to living with other relatives, the last of which is relatively rare and not
widely discussed in the literature1 .
The elderly may receive either informal care or formal home care or both. The elderly’s
level of functioning and thus the extent to which they need any type of care can be measured
by the elderly’s perception of their health status and how well they perform their Activities of
Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs). ADLs are loosely
defined as self-care tasks, such as getting in and out of bed and getting dressed. IADLs refer
to more socially, physically or mentally demanding tasks such as meal preparation and taking
medication. Both informal care and formal home care refer to the assistance with ADLs and
IADLs that are given to the elderly. The main distinction lies with the fact that informal care
is provided by household members, most notably spouses and adult children, while formal
1In fact, none of the studies reviewed in this dissertation addresses living with relatives.
home care is a service of medical professionals.
The economics and public health literatures on living arrangements are relatively sparse.
Some papers focus on the institutionalization process (Bowers, 1988; Gaugler et al., 2000;
Nihtila and Martikainen, 2008). Others concentrate on living with adult children relative to
living independently (Mutchler and Burr, 1991; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Costa, 1997;
Michael et al., 2001; Choi, 2003; Pal, 2006). Relatively few studies incorporate the options
of living independently, living with adult children and nursing home care in the same frame-
work (Boersch-Supan et al., 1990; Hoerger et al., 1996; Heiss et al., 2003; Charles and Sevak,
2005). Fewer studies include informal and formal home care as part of the living arrangements
(Gardner and Gilleskie, 2009).
Despite the variation in datasets and econometric models, there is much agreement in
the literature as to the frequency at which living arrangements are observed. All studies
reviewed in this dissertation conclude that, among the elderly, living independently is more
frequently observed than living with adult children and living with adult children is more
frequently observed than living in an institution. Boersch-Supan et al. (1990) study 3000
elders in Massachusetts in 1982-1986 and find that living independently is the predominant
mode of living arrangement. Roughly 60% of the sample lived independently throughout the
4-year period. The percentages of the sample living with adult children and in an institution
varied over time. The elders were more likely to be institutionalized as they grew older. In
1982, only 0.8% of the sample were in a nursing home. The proportion reached 22.2% four
years later. Charles and Sevak (2005) reach a similar conclusion, using the 1993-2000 waves
of the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset.
Changes in living arrangements or the availability of living arrangement options to the
elderly are primarily attributable to changes in health. Elders who live independently should
be able to perform all ADLs and most if not all IADLs. Once care is necessary, which in the
data is reflected by the need for helpers or respite care, the switch from living independently to
moving in with adult children or to being institutionalized is expected (Boersch-Supan et al.,
1990; Gaugler et al., 2000). The loss of one’s spouse can also decrease the probability of living
independently. Boersch-Supan et al. (1990) and similarly Nihtila and Martikainen (2008) find
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that upon the death of a spouse (usually within one year), the elderly tend to move in with
their children and, less frequently, move to an institution. The loss of a spouse may be seen
as a deterioration in mental health, as bereavement is highly associated with depression and
subsequently worse physical health (Michael et al., 2001).
Effects of a change in living arrangement on health have been studied quite extensively in
the epidemiology literature. Castle (2001) documents 121 publications and details how different
patterns of relocation induce physiological and psychological disturbances, collectively known
as the ‘relocation stress syndrome’, among the elderly. Overall, the literature seems to suggest
that a switch, particularly from living independently to being institutionalized, is generally
associated with an increase in mortality and a deterioration in functional health and co-morbid
conditions. However, it offers an improvement in some measures of personal life satisfaction,
most notably, the number of contacts. The severity of the change in living arrangement
depends on the quality of the new environment and whether the move is voluntary. In the
case of a spousal loss and the worsening of health, the elderly are unlikely to move voluntarily
and will experience rather severe health effects.
Another factor that impacts living arrangements among the elderly is wealth. Clearly,
individuals with larger budget sets can afford a wider range of living arrangements and do not
have to or do not always choose the cheapest option. Nevertheless, for an average individual,
living independently seems to be a normal good; the arrangement is chosen as income rises.
Residence in a nursing home seems to be an inferior good and living with adult children seems
to be somewhere in between, depending on the sample considered (Boersch-Supan et al., 1990;
Hoerger et al., 1996; Costa, 1997).
In addition to the amount of wealth, the type of wealth held by the elderly may also have
implications on living arrangements. Generally, the elderly hold wealth in two broad forms.
Annuitized wealth exists in the form of regular income flows such as Social Security benefits
or pensions. Most annuities cease upon the death of the owner, although some continue
providing limited benefits to survivors (i.e., spouses of deceased individuals who were primary
wage earners of the household). The other form is bequeathable wealth, which includes cash,
bank accounts, stocks, real estate properties and life insurance policies as well as any assets
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that can be passed on to the next generation2 . More heavily annuitized elderly individuals
are likely to have less leeway in choosing their living arrangements. They are constrained by
the income streams that they receive at a certain point in time, so if the change from their
current living arrangement to a different one requires more resources than they are annuitized
for, it may be difficult to switch. Elders with a higher percentage of bequeathable wealth
can downsize or liquidate their assets such that it is easier for them to change their living
arrangements (Jones, 1996). Also, Hoerger et al. (1996) find that living with adult children is
a more common phenomenon among households with larger housing (bequeathable) wealth.
Children move in with their parents to receive better housing and may provide care services in
return. However, the effect is statistically significant only among households with cognitively
aware parents, when the burden of care on the children’s part is low.
Health and wealth affect not only living arrangements but also each other. In addition
to the widely known positive correlation between wealth and health, a strand of literature is
dedicated to studying the relationship between health and the portfolio of wealth or the degree
of annuitization, to be more precise. In the face of longevity uncertainty, annuities provide
insurance against outliving one’s wealth. The elderly hedge the uncertainty of death by trading
their initial resources for streams of income that last until they die. The relationship between
the degree of annuitization and health seems to run both ways. Based on the 1992-2000
waves of the Health and Retirement Study, Dushi and Webb (2004) find that healthier elders
expect to live longer so they annuitize more. The mortality rate of the average annuitant is
significantly higher than that of the average population. However, Philipson and Becker (1998)
make a case that elders live longer because they annuitize more. Annuitized individuals have
a piece rate incentive for longevity and may be more likely to put efforts into self care, finding
it cheaper to live than less annuitized individuals do.
As an alternative to annuities, the elderly may be insured against depleting wealth before
death by their family members. The literature distinguishes among family members: the
2Based on data from the Health and Retirement Survey, Butrica and Mermin (2006) estimate that more than
50% of retirement wealth is annuitized while less than 20% comes from financial assets, a form of bequeathable
wealth.
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elderly’s spouses or their adult children. There is clear evidence for longevity risk pooling
between husbands and wives (Altonji et al., 1997; Walliser, 2000). Couples are able to rely on
each other’s resources in events of under-consumption and health risks. On the other hand,
children do not seem to step up as old-age insurance (Walliser, 2000). Mellor (2001) uses data
from two sources: the 1993 wave of Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD)
and the 1990 wave of Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). He finds that children are not
potential substitutes of long-term care insurance. Parents who buy long-term care insurance
do not take into account whether they are provided with informal care by their children. They
are not convinced that informal care will be provided at a constant, reliable rate. Annuities
may replace family functions as old-age insurance, especially if the elderly are without a spouse.
The discussion above shows that living arrangements, health and wealth of the elderly are
strongly linked and that the three outcomes are jointly determined. Living independently is
the most common living arrangement. Healthier and wealthier individuals are more likely
to live independently. In general, the elderly switch from living independently to intergen-
erational coresidence or institutionalization when their health deteriorates. The relocation
can in turn affect health; a move into a nursing home is largely linked to worsening health.
The impact of wealth on the move from living independently to the other arrangements is
unclear. Nevertheless, living independently is associated with more wealth, and in particular
more bequeathable wealth. Intergenerational coresidence is correlated with more housing (also
bequeathable) wealth on the parents’ part. Health and wealth also impact each other. In ad-
dition to the healthier-wealthier relationship, the elderly’s portfolio of wealth or, in particular,
the degree of annuitization seems to affect longevity (and health) positively. The relationship
between health and wealth adds another complexity to their contributions to the determination
of living arrangements.
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2.2 Inter Vivos Transfers and Bequests in Relation to Living
Arrangements
With regard to intergenerational transfers of wealth, this dissertation considers only down-
stream intergenerational transfers or transfers that are made from parents to adult children.
I leave out of the discussion the child-to-parent monetary transfers, as they are much less
frequently observed. According to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1993-2006,
the percentage of households making monetary gifts downstream is approximately 35% and
is higher with the inclusion of bequests. Approximately half of the interviewed households
reported an intention to leave a bequest to their children. In contrast, the percentage of the
HRS households that received upstream monetary transfers hovers around 5% across years.
Only a small number of studies on upstream intergenerational transfers have been published.
Sloan and Zhang (2002) offer mixed evidence of their existence depending critically on the
definition of transfers. Nishiyama (2002) acknowledges the existence of upstream transfers but
decides to disregard it completely upon lack of data.
Transfers of wealth can take place at different points in time. The term ‘inter vivos trans-
fers’, used interchangeably with ‘gifts’, refer to transfers made when the donor is alive. ‘End-
of-life transfers’, or ‘bequests’, refer to transfers made upon or after the donor’s death. Inter
vivos transfers and bequests differ and interconnect on many levels. In addition to their dif-
ference in time references, stylized facts suggest that inter vivos transfers are often distributed
unequally among children of the same household while bequests tend to be divided equally.
McGarry (1999) and Norton and Van Houtven (2006) find that 95% of children of households
that engage in intergenerational transfers in the US receive a bequest while only 40% of them
receive an inter vivos transfer. The joint consideration of inter vivos transfers and bequests
facilitates a better understanding of the transfer profile of parents over their life cycles.
The relationship between transfers of wealth and living arrangements lies with the fact that,
by making inter vivos transfers or making a bequest promise, parents may receive informal
care from their adult children. According to the theory of ‘exchange’, otherwise known as the
‘strategic bequest motive’, older parents make a financial transfer to their adult children to
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elicit or to compensate for informal care or services provided (Bernheim et al., 1986). The
theory has some support in the literature. Based on data from the 1993 and 1995 waves
of the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), Norton and Van Houtven
(2006) use logistic regressions with household fixed effects and find evidence in support of the
exchange hypothesis for inter vivos transfers but not for bequests. Cox and Rank (1992) use
data from the 1987-1988 National Survey of Family and Households and estimate two equations
at the child level, one for the probability of receiving inter vivos transfers and the other for
the amount. The authors find that an increase in child income decreases the probability but
increases the amount of inter vivos transfers. As their income rises, adult children have higher
opportunity costs of time, will be less likely to provide informal care and therefore less likely to
receive a transfer. Nevertheless, when/if they decide to provide care, their time will be valued
more and have to be compensated for accordingly. The authors conclude that their results are
consistent with the exchange hypothesis.
The theory of exchange is not the only theory that explains why elderly parents make finan-
cial transfers and it is not always supported empirically3 . But, as Norton and Van Houtven
(2006) and Cox and Rank (1992) point out, the theory has some validity. I do not test the
theory in this dissertation. Instead I allow for the possibility that it may affect the manner
in which the elderly receive informal care and choose their living arrangements. Also, house-
holds that make inter vivos transfers or a bequest promise may have characteristics that are
different from those that do not, which has an implication on the distribution of unobserved
3Most studies that attempt to understand the elderly’s decision to transfer assets to adult children con-
centrate heavily on three theories. The theory of ‘exchange’ argues that older parents receive care by their
children and will compensate them according to the amount of informal care provided (Bernheim et al., 1986;
Norton and Van Houtven, 2006). The theory of ‘altruism’ refers to the fact that older parents wish to equalize
consumption levels among their children, thereby transferring more assets to poorer children (Altonji et al.,
1997; McGarry, 1999; Brown, 2004, 2007). In contrast with the first two theories where transfers are intentional
and the focus is on an unequal distribution of wealth within the same household, the final theory argues that
transfers are accidental. The ‘accidental’ theory does not distinguish between children who receive transfers and
children who do not. Bequests are simply assets that are not exhausted because parents cannot anticipate their
death with certainty. According to the accidental theory, the consumption behavior of older parents should be
consistent with the life cycle hypothesis; the elderly spend down at an increasing rate as they expect their end
of life (Hurd et al., 2007). These three theories have been treated as separate subjects of research with few
studies attempting to address them together (Cox and Rank, 1992; Wilhelm, 1996; Sloan and Norton, 1997;
Light and McGarry, 2004) . Empirical evidence in support of either theory has been mixed. I do not attempt
to test or validate any of the theories in this dissertation.
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heterogeneity of the population.
The literature provides reasons why elderly parents make monetary transfers to their chil-
dren. First, as Mellor (2001) suggests, children cannot always be relied on for informal care.
Parents with preferences for informal care make a transfer to elicit care. Second, informal
care is associated with an improvement in health and can delay institutionalization for the
elderly, where institutionalization is potentially the least preferred living arrangement for the
average individual. Charles and Sevak (2005) find that informal care reduces the risk of a
nursing home entry, replacing care that is provided in a nursing home. Gaugler et al. (2000)
and similarly Bowers (1988) argue that even when informal care is not the primary source
of care for the parents, children’s involvement (especially with ADLs and overnight respite)
helps alleviate stress on the professional helper’s part and delays institutionalization. Finally,
parents may simply enjoy their children’s company and make a transfer (in-cash or in-kind)
to induce coresidence. Choi (2003) identifies cases where parents are healthy and wealthy and
yet live with their adult children who may not provide any services in return.
2.3 The Role of Public Policy
The joint evolution of living arrangements, health, wealth and intergenerational transfers
is further complicated by two other factors: Medicaid eligibility and estate and gift taxes.
Details of Medicaid elibility criteria and of the interactions between estate and gift taxes are
included in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.
Medicaid alters the relative prices of living arrangements. It significantly reduces the cost
of nursing home care and, in some states, provides subsidies for home health care when the
elderly live in the community4 . The reduction in the price of a living arrangement relative to
the other options as a result of Medicaid eligibility alters the relative value of different living
arrangements. The literature on the impact of Medicaid on living arrangements is rare and the
conclusions are mixed. Hoerger et al. (1996) find that loosening Medicaid eligibility criteria
increases only the use of nursing home services and does not affect living independently nor
4The benefit is known as Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS).
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shared housing. Muramatsu et al. (2007) and Grabowski and Gruber (2007) argue that nursing
home utilization is price inelastic. Changes in Medicaid-related policies at the state level,
including increasing the level of commitment to providing home health care relative to nursing
home care and relaxing Medicaid eligibility criteria, do not affect the level of nursing home
use and do not delay institutionalization. The efforts to keep the elderly in the community,
thereby reducing costs of nursing home care borne by the states, do not seem to have support
empirically.
Estate and gift taxes enter the elderly’s decision to make a monetary transfer to adult
children directly. As explained in Appendix B, transfer tax incentives alter the choice be-
tween bequests and inter vivos transfers. The government allows annual and lifetime exclusion
thresholds, below which parents can make monetary (inter vivos) transfers to their children
without having to pay tax. Taxable gifts made within three years of the parent’s death are
subject to the estate tax. However, if gifts are distributed earlier and their values are below the
exclusion thresholds, taxes need not apply at all. The bias is in favor of inter vivos transfers. In
light of longevity uncertainty, parents who wish to maximize the amount of intergenerational
transfers should make frequent inter vivos transfers and do so at an increasing rate as death
approaches.
Joulfaian and McGarry (2004) and Poterba (1998) explore whether the elderly attempt
to maximize the amount of transfers to their children by exploiting tax avoidance channels.
They similarly conclude that the elderly do not do so. Based on data from 1992-2000 waves of
AHEAD and HRS, Joulfaian and McGarry (2004) restrict their sample to the initially wealthy
or those with a higher level of bequeathable wealth than the lifetime exclusion limit in 1992 and
1993. They find weak evidence in support of spending down, even when they control for life
expectancy and health. The elderly do not accelerate the amount of intergenerational transfers
as they become older and less healthy. Poterba (1998) finds that only a small percentage of the
elderly with bequeathable wealth (about one-third) make inter vivos transfers as they become
more frail.
That tax incentives have smaller effects than expected implies that they do not explain
the transfer behavior in its entirety. The elderly may wish to keep their resources for later
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life care; they save in anticipation of future morbidity. It is also possible that the ‘exchange’
motive operate counteractively to tax incentives. Because there may be moral hazard in giving
children a lump sum now and expecting the promise of care to be fulfilled later, parents may
wish to award an amount smaller than the exclusion threshold to their children in order to
elicit a greater frequency of informal care.
To better understand the dynamics of living arrangements, it is important to know that
the outcomes of living arrangements, health, wealth and intergenerational transfers are jointly
determined. These outcomes are also affected by public policies, including Medicaid and
transfer taxes, which need to be incorporated into the analysis.
2.4 Limitations of the Literature
Overall the literature seems to suffer some limitations. Most living arrangement studies
treat health and wealth as exogenous. With regard to health, the living arrangement literature
is largely based on narrowly defined samples such as institutionalized elderly individuals or
disabled individuals (Hoerger et al., 1996; Costa, 1997). This takes away the importance
of health transitions since individuals included in these samples already have chronic health
conditions and require care at all times. Their selection into a living arrangement is likely to be
time-invariant. Weath is also treated as given, with the exception of Heiss et al. (2003). Few
studies account for the importance of intergenerational transfers on living arrangements (and
vice versa). Only Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Pezzin and Schone (1999) incorporate
intergenerational transfers into the living arrangement framework, but both papers are limited
to the comparison between living independently and coresidence and do not take into account
unobserved preferences of the parents. The existing literature has not sufficiently incorporated
the joint evolution of living arrangements, health, wealth and intergenerational transfers.
Studies that consider care arrangements of the elderly fall within the intergenerational
transfer literature and focus on informal caregiving according to the ‘exchange’ hypothesis (Cox
and Rank, 1992; Wilhelm, 1996; Norton and Van Houtven, 2006). They attempt to explain the
characteristics of informal caregivers and factors affecting the level of informal caregiving but
14
they take wealth and living arrangements as exogenous, even though they are strongly linked.
For example, intergenerational coresidence likely induces informal caregiving and at the same
time the provision of informal care may necessitate intergenerational coresidence. In addition,
the development of market-provided paid care is largely ignored in the literature. The fact
that formal home care can be a potentially perfect substitute for informal care has important
implications on the changes of living arrangement over time. With competing demand for time
of adult children due to labor force participation, marriage, etc., it has become increasingly
more likely that elderly parents can no longer rely on informal care (which they traditionally
would) and have to resort to formal home care instead (Pezzin and Schone, 1999).
Relatively few studies have attempted to control for the endogeneity of outcomes that
affect the living arrangement decision. While not directly addressing the interrelationships
among health, wealth, intergenerational transfers and living arrangements, Boersch-Supan
et al. (1990) and Hoerger et al. (1996) model unobserved heterogeneity (and autocorrelated
errors) across living arrangement alternatives using a multiperiod multinomial probit model.
Heiss et al. (2003) consider the joint trajectories of health, wealth and living arrangements in
the US, using data from the Health and Retirement Study. The authors use a method similar
to the Vector Autoregression (VAR) system. The technique requires conditional independence
among the dependent variables over time such that their estimates are conditional on the first
observation of each individual. Therefore, the state variables are estimated separately, unlike
the discrete factor estimation method that this dissertation uses. The authors also do not
explicitly model asset transfer behavior. Instead, they argue that coresidence implies transfers
to the needy since it benefits whoever is poorer in the living arrangement. The argument would
not hold true for wealthy elderly individuals who need care and prefer to receive it from their
adult children rather than from professional helpers. They may make an intergenerational
transfer that induces informal caregiving and also coresidence. To the extent that the elderly
care about the source of care, the living arrangement could benefit the elderly more than the
adult children, relative to before coresidence is realized. Unobserved preferences across related
outcomes can produce misleading results, if not properly accounted for.
Most closely related to this paper is Gardner and Gilleskie (2009). Also using the discrete
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factor random effects estimation method and the HRS data, the authors jointly estimate
health transitions, health insurance coverage, long-term care arrangements, savings and gifting
decisions over time. The paper focuses on whether Medicaid eligibility criteria impact savings
and gifting behavior of the elderly. Medicaid policies are found to have a small but significant
effect on the savings decisions but an insignicant effect on the gifting decisions. This paper
differs from Gardner and Gilleskie (2009) in that its focus lies with the provision of care through
household formation decisions and that this paper accounts for how inter vivos transfers and
bequests affect living arrangements of the elderly.
This study fills the gap in the literature by modeling the living arrangement, health, wealth
and monetary transfer outcomes jointly using the nonlinear discrete factor random effects
method. It combines together living arrangements (which are categorized as independent
living, coresidence and nursing home) and care arrangements (with the categories of informal
care, formal home care and nursing home care) such that when the elderly choose whom to
live with, they also choose the type of care received. The study is one of the few existing
studies that model living arrangements with transfer behavior, that extend the scope of care
to include formal home care realizing the substitutability between informal and formal home
care, and that incorporate Medicaid benefits and eligibity criteria as well as transfer taxes over
a long panel of data.
16
Chapter 3
Theoretical Model
I present a simple theoretical model that describes how elderly parents choose their living
arrangements as they age and the impact of these decisions on health, wealth and intergen-
erational transfers (and vice versa). For notational simplicity, I assume the representative
household consists of one parent (denoted by P ) and one child (denoted by K). I allow for
interactions between the parent and the child through the inclusion of downstream intergen-
erational transfers in the budget contraint and the fact that the child can choose to provide
informal care for the parent. Because the empirical analysis is at the parent level, I focus on
the decisions made by the parent.
3.1 Timing Assumptions
The following timing assumptions are made based on the timing in which key variables are
measured in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), on which this dissertation is based.
1. The elderly parent enters each period with her personal characteristics (XPt ), a subjective
health status entering period t (Ht), a functional health status entering period t (Dt), wealth
composed of 1) an annuitized stream of income entering period t that ceases upon death (Yt)
and 2) savings that can be used for contemporaneous consumption or bequeathed to the child
upon death (At−1) as well as the experience of her living arrangement in the previous period
(LAt−1). The parent also knows the child’s characteristics at t (XKt ).
Even though subjective health and functional health represent the same thing: health
status, I include them both in the model1 . Subjective health contains different characteristics
of the parent than functional health2 . Subjective health measures the extent to which the
parent is optimistic about her overall health status, which could include, for example, whether
the parent feels hindered by her health conditions, if any. Functional health represents the
extent to which the parent needs help with daily activities and her level of independence.
2. Based on the information entering the period, the parent simultaneously makes decisions
on whether or not an inter vivos transfer is made (IVt) and its amount (IV At), the amount of
savings or bequeathable wealth (At) and the per-period living arrangement (LAt). The parent
also states her intention to leave a bequest (Bt), should she pass away by the end of the period.
Living arrangement takes one of the following six states:
LAt =

0 if the parent lives independently and receives no care;
1 if the parent lives independently and receives informal care;
2 if the parent lives independently and receives formal home care;
3 if the parent lives with an adult child and receives no care;
4 if the parent lives with an adult child and receives informal care;
5 if the parent lives with an adult child and receives formal home care;
6 if the parent lives in a nursing home or a hospice.
Formal home care is defined as receiving assistance with ADLs or IADLs from professional
helpers or having had visits or in-home services from professional helpers. Informal care is
defined as receiving assistance with ADLs or IADLs from the child. Since formal home care
and informal care are exclusive options, whenever the parent receives both types of care in the
data, I assume that informal care is insufficient or irregular such that the parent is treated as
receiving just formal home care.
In the HRS, there are a total of six ADL and five IADL questions. ADLs consist of
1Empirically, health may not be measured perfectly with one objective (and available) measure. Rather, the
data provide several measures of health.
2Also, individually, subjective health and functional health may affect the distribution of unobserved hetero-
geneity in different ways. As will be seen in the estimation results, both subjective health and functional health
are statistically significant across the equations estimated. This supports the fact that both of them should be
included in the model.
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the elderly’s ability to dress, walk, bathe, eat, get in and out of bed, and use the toilet.
IADLs include meal preparation, grocery shopping, making phone calls, taking medication,
and managing money.
3. Subjective health and functional health status are updated at the end of the period,
becoming Ht+1 and Dt+1 respectively. Subjective health takes one of the following four states:
Ht+1 =

0 if the parent is reported deceased;
1 if the parent reports poor health;
2 if the parent reports good or fair health;
3 if the parent reports excellent/very good health.
Functional health takes one of the following three states:
Dt+1 =

0 if the parent has severe disability;
1 if the parent has moderate disability;
2 if the parent has no disability.
Severe disability is defined as having difficulties with three or more ADLs, regardless of
how many IADLs the parent has difficulties with. Moderate disability is defined as having
difficulties with less than three ADLs, regardless of how many IADLs the parent has difficulties
with. The parent is said to have no disability when she has no difficulty with any ADLs or
any IADLs.
Death is an absorbing health state. Conditional on the parent’s death, a bequest ar-
rangement (Bt+1|Ht+1 = 0) and its amount (BAt+1|Ht+1 = 0) may be observed. The vec-
tor of information available to the parent entering period t is denoted by the state vector
st = {Ht, Dt, At−1, LAt−1, Yt, XPt , XKt }, where st ∈ St, the entire state space.
A number of features of the model are implicit in the timing assumptions. First, experi-
ence with a living arrangement in the past (and/or fixed costs associated with moving due to
the decision to change the current living arrangement) affects decisions made in the present.
Suppose that, everything else being equal, the parent prefers living independently to living
in an intergenerational household or being institutionalized. Past experience with an inter-
generational household or a nursing home may reduce the parent’s aversion to either living
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arrangement and induce her to choose one of them again in the current period. Second, I
assume that past inter vivos transfers do not affect the child’s current informal care behavior.
If the receipt of inter vivos transfers motivates informal care, its effect is contemporaneous.
The parent cannot incentivize the child into providing care in the current period by recalling
past transfers3 .
Savings (bequeathable wealth) is a choice variable in the model; annuitized wealth is not.
The per-period level of annuitized wealth for retirees typically does not change over time,
except for inflation-proof pension schemes and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) which
may be withdrawn or added depending on the value of assets in the elderly’s possession.
Also, annuitized wealth is determined by work history and occupational decisions that were
made prior to data collection for most HRS respondents. Therefore the choice variable that
represents wealth in the estimation is savings. Changing over time, savings include assets that
are relatively liquid such as checking, IRA or KEOGH accounts and those that are less liquid
such as stocks, bonds, vehicles, businesses and real estate. In addition to changes in interest
rate and portfolio adjustments, savings also change if the parent overspent or underspent her
annuitized income in the earlier period or if the parent purchases life insurance using her
annuitized income.
3.2 The Elderly’s Optimization Problem
The elderly parent maximizes a utility function defined over her own consumption (CPt ),
her child’s consumption (CKt ), her health (Ht and Dt) and an error term (εt). The utility
function is increasing in all arguments. The parent’s health is subject to a production function,
which depends on inputs of informal care provided by the child (IKt ), formal home care (Ft),
personal characteristics and health shocks (υt and ωt). Both IKt and Ft are captured in
the choice of living arrangement (LAt). The error term εt can be decomposed into a time-
invariant component (µ), a time-varying component (νt) and an idiosyncratic, independently
3Considering that the amount of transfers is relatively small in the dataset (an average of $11570 for 24
months), the assumption is quite reasonable. Also, some papers in the literature model the provision of informal
care as a simultaneous game, e.g., Pezzin and Schone (1999) and, more implicitly, Hoerger et al. (1996).
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and identically distributed term (ut).
The elderly parent lives for T periods after the child becomes an adult. From period 1 to
T − 1, the parent chooses the level of her own consumption (CPt ), whether to receive formal
home care or informal care (LAt), the rate of informal care compensation (P It ), how much to
save (At) and the amount of inter vivos transfers made to the child (IV At). The parent may
also state her intention to leave a bequest if/when she dies. Although I include the bequest
intent variable in my empirical model, I leave it out of the theoretical framework for simplicity
and for two other reasons. First, because time of death is uncertain, the intention to leave a
bequest represents whether it is optimal for the parent to leave bequests when she actually
dies. I discuss actual bequests later in the chapter. Second, to a certain extent, inter vivos
transfers represent the intention to leave a bequest. Both may induce informal care according
to the theory of exchange. At the end of time T , the parent leaves a bequest to her child
(BAT+1). Essentially, BAT+1 can be treated as a limiting case of IV At at T 4 .
Under a given living arrangement, the parent’s utility function is given by:
UP (CPt , C
K
t ,Ht, Dt, εt).
The budget constraint facing the parent is:
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+Gsmt 1[Yt + (1 + rt)At−1 ≤ Qsmt ](la1t + la2t + la4t + la5t + la6t ),∀t,
where lajt=1 if the living arrangement j is chosen and 0 otherwise. The living arrangement
alternatives j = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} are defined above. The parent purchases consumption. She
chooses to purchase either formal home care with the total cost of PFt , informal care with the
total cost of P It or nursing home care with the total cost of P
N
t . If the parent lives indepen-
dently, she pays P ILt , which may include, for instance, the costs of housing maintenance and
4Under a given living arrangement, BAT+1 should be a function of savings at time T , the amount of inter
vivos transfers at t = 1, 2, ...T , and the exclusion thresholds over time.
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rent. If her living arrangement is intergenerational coresidence, she faces P ICt which theoreti-
cally represents, for instance, in-kind transfers or the costs of shared household responsibilities
such as taking care of her grandchildren, for example5 . The parent may make an inter vivos
transfer subjected to τ IV At , the statutory gift tax. The gift tax is conditional on the annual
and lifetime exclusion amounts, discussed in Appendix B. The distinction between informal
care purchases (P It ) and inter vivos transfers (IV At) is blurred in the data. It is not possible
to determine if transfers were made as a payment for informal care or for other (altruistically
motivated) reasons.
The parent’s current wealth is composed of Yt, a fixed stream of income and At−1, the
amount of savings from the previous period. I assume the same rate of interest (rt) across all
types of assets for notational ease. The parent who receives any form of care may receive a
government transfer Gsmt , including Medicaid benefits
6 . The threshold Qsmt refers to a level
of wealth (assets and/or income) below which the parent’s wealth has to be in order to qualify
for public benefits in state s at time t, through pathway m where the pathway may be the
categorically needy, the medically needy or the HCBS pathway, to name a few. Table A.1 in
Appendix A shows different income and asset thresholds used by states to determine Medicaid
eligibility in 1998 according to living arrangements and personal characteristics.
The health production functions take the following forms:
Ht+1 = H(Ht, Dt, Ft, IKt ,Mt, υt)
Dt+1 = D(Ht, Dt, Ft, IKt ,Mt, ωt).
5The model assumes everyone receives the same amount of formal home care and/or informal care so that
the Pt are not unit prices. Although the HRS has a measure of how much care each elderly individual received
in their helper-level files, the measure is very incomplete and scattered across years. Some people may report
how much care they received each day (in terms of hours), but not how many days of the week nor if they
received care every week. Email correspondences with the HRS staff have not resolved the issue.
6If we are to think of the government transfer Gst as a (Medicaid) discount applied to the cost of care,
then it applies to all types of care: formal, informal or nursing home care. Medicaid provides nursing home
care which drastically reduces PNt , and it also provides Home and Community Based Services (HCBS) benefits
(which include, for example, private duty nursing, family training, home health aides, life-sustaining utility
reimbursement, habilitation services and respite care) which reduce PFt . Some states also provide subsidies
and/or tax credits to informal or full-time caregivers e.g. the 500 USD tax credit in Missouri and Calfornia,
which reduce P It .
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Current health, subjective and functional, is determined not only by inputs of formal home
care or informal care, but also by past health and health-facility characteristics in the area in
which the parent lives (Mt).
The child is assumed to outlive the parent and maximizes her utility function based on her
own consumption, leisure and informal care provision7 (CKt ,L
K
t , I
K
t ) and her parent’s health
8
(Ht, Dt). Under the living arrangement j chosen by the parent9 , the child’s per-period
optimization problem takes the following form:
max
CKt, L
K
t ,I
K
t
UK(CKt , L
K
t , I
K
t ,Ht, Dt|LAt = j)
subject to CKt ≤ IV At + P It 1[IKt ≥ It(Ht, Dt)] + wKt (TT − LKt − IKt ),∀t,
where TT represents the total amount of time available in each period and 1[IKt ≥ It] is an
indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the child provides at least as much informal care
as the parent requires. It can be thought of as the time needed to assist the parent with all
the ADL difficulties that she faces; it is increasing as the parent’s subjective and/or functional
health worsens. The child only receives a payment for her informal care services if she spends
more time than It10 .
A contemporaneous demand function for the child is given by:
ZK = {CKt , LKt , IKt } = ZK(P It , IV At, wKt )
7The marginal utility of informal care provision may vary by the parent’s health.
8Note that even though health of adult children may seemingly be important in the decision to provide
informal care, it is a norm in the literature to leave it out in a model with parental health. Including the
child’s health, researchers would run into the problem of two-sided altruism in a bargaining solution framework
where health of adult children and health of the parents enter each other’s utility function and are correlated
with other decisions, ultimately overcomplicating the analysis and taking away from the focus of the study.
I provide examples of studies that deal with parental health in the literature review section and none of the
studies incorporates children’s health, implicitly or explicitly. An example of a study that deals directly with
children’s health is Coe and Van Houtven (2009), which does assume parental health to be exogenous.
9I assume the living arrangement to be chosen by only the parent (as opposed to a negotiation between the
parent and the child) or the model would change significantly. Examples of studies that model intra-household
negotiations with regard to informal care and living arrangements include Stern (1995) and Hiedemann and
Stern (1999).
10Alternatively, we can rewrite the above constraint by replacing P It 1[I
K
t ≥ It(Ht, Dt)] with P It (la1t + la4t ).
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where P It and IV At are decisions made by the parent and w
K
t is exogenous.
The parent incorporates the child’s demand functions into her optimization process. Sub-
stituting the child’s consumption level and informal care with the demand functions above,
the parent’s utility function and budget constraint become:
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respectively, where h is the subjective health state and d is the functional health state of the
parent entering the period.
The health state entering the period can take the subjective health values h where h =
{0, 1, 2, 3}, the functional health values d where d = {0, 1, 2}. The available alternatives of
living arrangement are denoted as j where j = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, the available alternatives of
savings as a, the available alternatives of inter vivos transfers as i and the available alternatives
of informal care purchases as w where a, i and w are continuous values. The lifetime value of
the alternatives available to the parent at time t is:
V hdjaiwt(st, εt) = U
P (CPt , C
K(P It = w, IV At = i, w
K
t ),Ht = h,Dt = d) + ε
hd
jaiwt
+β[
3∑
h′=1
P (Ht+1 = h′)P (Dt+1 = d′)V h
′d′
t+1 (st+1)
+P (Ht+1 = 0)V 0t+1(st+1)],
where CPt = Yt+ (1+ rt)At−1+Gsmt 1[Yt+ (1+ rt)At−1 ≤ Qsmt ](la1t + la2t + la4t + la5t + la6t )
−PFt (la2t + la5t )
−(P It = w)(la1t + la4t )1[IKt (P It = w, IV At = i, wKt ) ≥ It(Ht = h,Dt = d)]
−PNt (la6t )− P ILt (la0t + la1t + la2t )− P ICt (la3t + la4t + la5t )
−(1 + τ IV At )−1(IV At = i)− (At = a).
The utility associated with the deceased health state is V 0(st+1), where V 0(st+1) = f(At).
By definition, individuals die at the end of T , hence V (sT+1) = f(AT ). The parent receives
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utility leaving her lifetime bequest to the child after she dies. The maximal expected value of
lifetime utility is given by:
V hdt (st) = Et−1[ max
z={jaiw}∈Z
[V hdzt (st, εt)∀h,∀d, ∀t]],
where Z is the set of all available alternatives.
25
Chapter 4
Empirical Framework
The theoretical framework and the available variables in the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) motivate the dynamic empirical model that I estimate. The analysis is at the parent
(respondent) level. The observable outcomes in my model include 1) living arrangements, 2)
bequeathable wealth or savings, 3) the probability of making inter vivos transfers and the
amount of inter vivos transfers made to adult children, 4) the intention to leave bequests to
adult children when the parent is still alive, 5) subjective health including death, 6) functional
health and 7) the decision to leave bequests to adult children and the amount, conditional on
the parent’s death.
4.1 Level of Analysis
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), one can conduct an empirical
analysis at (at least) three meaningful levels: parent/respondent, household or child. In the
discussion that follows, I focus on justifying why the parent/respondent level is appropriate
for my estimation, comparing it with the household level. Child-level analyses are irrelevant
to the model as parents are the decision makers.
First, it is important to distinguish between unmarried households and married households.
There is only one person in an unmarried household, in which case all the dependent variables
and explanatory variables in the model are already at the respondent level. However, there
are two individuals in a married household and the HRS study keeps some information at
the individual level and other information at the household level. It is in the case of married
households that choosing the level of analysis becomes critical.
The HRS keeps wealth variables (At) and the decision to make an inter vivos transfer (IVt)
at the household level. Individuals in a married household do not differ on these outcomes.
Income variables (including annuitized wealth (Yt) and earned income which are part of be-
queathable wealth) are also stored in the household files but can be individualized. Other
key variables in the model are stored at the respondent level, namely subjective health (Ht),
functional health (Dt), bequest (Bt), and informal care provision (It). Individuals in a married
household can differ on these outcomes.
Married couples can also differ on their living arrangements (LAt) partly by construction.
Whether the couple lives with their children or not is a household-level outcome because the
couple shares the same children. However, the receipt of formal home care or informal care
and being institutionalized are individual-level outcomes. For example, it is possible that only
one of the parents receives informal care from their children even though both parents live
together in the same household. Combining whether parents live with their children with the
type of care they receive means that two individuals in a married household may (or may not)
have different living arrangements.
Clearly, some of the outcomes may be better estimated at the household level, yet I estimate
all the equations at the respondent level to avoid overcomplicating the analysis. Outcomes that
individuals in a married household share or may share include living arrangements, savings,
and inter vivos transfers. If the husband and the wife were to be treated as separate units of
analysis in these equations, the correlation in their error terms may not be properly accounted
for. But with the long panel of data that I have, there should be enough variation within
the same household over time to minimize estimation bias. Morever, I use two strategies to
address the importance of marital status in the model. First, I separate out married households
from unmarried households when I estimate the living arrangements, savings and inter vivos
transfers equations1 so that discrepancies between the two groups of households, if any, can
1To see if the vector of coefficients for married and unmarried households are statistically different, I estimate
these equations, without unobserved heterogeneity. For each equation, I include both groups of households,
interact the explanatory variables with the marital status indicator and use the explanatory variables and the
interacted variables on the right hand side of the equation. Essentially, I conduct the Wald test (or, in the case
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be easily identified. Second, I include some spousal variables on the right hand side in hopes
of capturing the costs/benefits of the outcomes borne by the spouse.
In fact, as an experiment, I estimated the equations without unobserved heterogeneity at
the household level and compared it with the results from the respondent level. To represent
the married households, I chose the oldest of the couple in one estimation and the youngest in
another. I formally tested cross-model hypotheses of whether or not the vector of coefficients
depends on the level of analysis in seeming unrelated estimations. When the coefficients from
the parent level estimation are compared with those from the household level estimations (one
including only the oldest member and the other only the youngest member of the household),
the Chi-square test statistics on all endogeneous variables are quite small and most of them
are not statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall, while the results of the experiment
do not necessarily support estimating the equations of interest at the parent/respondent level,
they also do not rule it out as inappropriate.
4.2 Specifications
The timing assumptions and the value function in the theoretical model motivate the
empirical specifications. Based on the theoretical model, explanatory variables include the
parent’s annuitized income (Yt), her characteristics (XPt ), health-facility characteristics in the
area (Mt), the child’s average characteristics and income (XKt and w
K
t respectively
2), a tax
incentive variable (τ IV A), government transfer variables that vary by the parent’s state of
residence and over time(Qsmt ) and variables that measure the price of formal home care (P
F
t ),
the price of nursing home care (PNt ), the cost of independent living (P
IL
t ) and the cost of
living with children (P ICt ), all of which vary by state and over time. Some of the explanatory
of continuous dependent variables, the Chow test) on the coefficients of the interacted variables and find that
they are statistically different from zero. This suggests that the equations should be estimated separately for
the two groups of households.
2In the specifications, I ignore wKt . Children’s wages are not available in the data. HRS has a crude measure
of children’s incomes, but the information is largely missing across years. In 2006, for example, over 70% of
children in the child-level data were missing their income information. Also, children’s wages are likely to be
correlated with the parents’ wealth. I attempt to capture children’s wages by their education and whether or not
they work instead, which albeit still correlated with parental characteristics, are likely to be less problematic.
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Table 4.1: Respondent-Level Equations
Dependent Variables Explanatory Variables
Endogenous Exogenous
LAt Ht, Dt,At−1, LAt−1 Yt, XPt , XKt , PFt , PNt , P ILt , P ICt , τ IVt , Q
sm
t ,Mt
At Ht, Dt,At−1, LAt−1 Yt, XPt , XKt , PFt , PNt , P ILt , P ICt , τ IVt , Q
sm
t ,Mt
IVt and IV At Ht, Dt,At−1, LAt−1 Yt, XPt , XKt , PFt , PNt , P ILt , P ICt , τ IVt , Q
sm
t ,Mt
Bt Ht, Dt,At−1, LAt−1 Yt, XPt , XKt , PFt , PNt , P ILt , P ICt , τ IVt , Q
sm
t ,Mt
Ht+1 Ht, Dt,At, LAt Yt, X
P
t ,Mt
Dt+1 Ht, Dt,At, LAt Yt, X
P
t ,Mt
Bt+1 and BAt+1 Ht, Dt,At, LAt Yt, XPt
variables act as exclusion restrictions that help identify the system of equations shown below.
The timing assumptions dictate that some decision variables enter the right hand side of
the equations. Subjective health (Ht) and functional health (Dt) entering the period and
living arrangements (LAt−1) and savings or bequeathable wealth (At−1) in the previous period
affect each of the per-period parental behaviors (i.e., living arrangements, savings, inter vivos
transfers and bequest intent) as endogenous variables. The period t behaviors, in turn, affect
subjective and functional health transitions. Table 4.1 details the explanatory variables for
each modeled equation. Note that the first four outcomes are functions of the same variables
because these outcomes are modeled as jointly made decisions.
The system of jointly estimated equations are specified below, where α, β, γ, θ, δ, ζ, η, ϕ and
κ are the coefficients to be estimated3 . In addition to the variables in Table 4.1, unobservables
explain each outcome. I allow the unobservables (εt) to be correlated across equations by
decomposing them into three components: a time-invariant component (µ), a time-varying
component (νt) and an idiosyncratic, independently and identically distributed term (ut).
More formally, εeot = µ
e
o + ν
e
ot + u
e
ot, according to the equation estimated (e) and the outcome
of each equation (o).
In log odds, the probability of being in a living arrangement j relative to living indepen-
dently and receiving no care is given by:
3 Note that additional moments or interactions of the explanatory variables also enter the specifications.
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ln
[
P (LAt = j)
P (LAt = 0)
]
= α0j+α1jHt+α2jDt+α3jAt−1+α4jLAt−1+α5jYt+α6jXPt +α7jXKt +
α8jP
F
t + α9jP
N
t + α10jP
IL
t + α11jP
IC
t + α12jτ
IV A
t + α13jQ
sm
t + α14jMt + µ
1
j + ν
1
jt, j = 1, ..., 6.
The bequeathable wealth/savings equation is given by:
ln(At) = β0+ β1Ht+ β2Dt+ β3At−1+ β4LAt−1+ β5Yt+ β6XPt + β7XKt + β8PFt + β9PNt +
β10P
IL
t + β11P
IC
t + β12τ
IV A
t + β13Q
sm
t + β14Mt + µ
2 + ν2t + u
2
t .
The probability of making an inter vivos transfer expressed in log odds and the amount of
inter vivos transfers given to the average child are respectively given by:
ln
[
P (IVt = 1|Ht 6= 0)
P (IVt = 0|Ht 6= 0)
]
= γ0+ γ1Ht+ γ2Dt+ γ3At−1+ γ4LAt−1+ γ5Yt+ γ6XPt + γ7XKt +
γ8P
F
t + γ9P
N
t + γ10P
IL
t + γ11P
IC
t + γ12τ
IV A
t + γ13Q
sm
t + γ14Mt + µ
3 + ν3t ;
ln(IV At|IVt = 1 & Ht 6= 0) = θ0 + θ1Ht + θ2Dt + θ3At−1 + θ4LAt−1 + θ5Yt + θ6XPt +
θ7X
K
t + θ8P
F
t + θ9P
N
t + θ10P
IL
t + θ11P
IC
t + θ12τ
IV A
t + θ13Q
sm
t + θ14Mt + µ
4 + ν4t + u
4
t .
The probability of reporting the intention to leave a bequest in log odds is given by:
ln
[
P (Bt = 1|Ht 6= 0)
P (Bt = 0|Ht 6= 0)
]
= δ0 + δ1Ht + δ2Dt + δ3At−1 + δ4LAt−1 + δ5Yt + δ6XPt + δ7XKt +
δ8P
F
t + δ9P
N
t + δ10P
IL
t + δ11P
IC
t + δ12τ
IV A
t + δ13Q
sm
t + δ14Mt + µ
5 + ν5t .
Health transitions are modeled at the end of the period after the four behavioral outcomes
are observed. The probability of being in a subjective health state h in period t + 1 relative
to having excellent or very good health in log odds is given by:
ln
[
P (Ht+1 = h)
P (Ht+1 = 3)
]
= ζ0h+ ζ1hHt+ ζ2hDt+ ζ3hAt+ ζ4hLAt+ ζ5hYt+ ζ6hXPt + ζ7hMt+µ
6
h+
ν6ht, h = 0, 1, 2.
The probability of being in a functional health state d in period t+1 relative to having no
disability in log odds is given by:
ln
[
P (Dt+1 = d)
P (Dt+1 = 2)
]
= η0d+η1dHt+η2dDt+η3dAt+η4dLAt+η5dYt+η6dXPt +η7dMt+µ
7
d+
ν7dt, d = 0, 1.
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If an individual dies during period t (Ht+1 = 0), then I observe whether or not a bequest
was made and its amount. The probability of making a bequest and the amount of bequests
given to the average child conditional on being dead are respectively given by:
ln
[
P (Bt+1 = 1|Ht+1 = 0)
P (Bt+1 = 0|Ht+1 = 0)
]
= ϕ0+ϕ1Ht+ϕ2Dt+ϕ3At+ϕ4LAt+ϕ5Yt+ϕ6XPt +µ
8+ν8t ;
ln(BAt+1|Bt+1 = 1 & Ht+1 = 0) = κ0 + κ1Ht + κ2Dt + κ3At + κ4LAt + κ5Yt + κ6XPt +
µ9 + ν9t + u
9
t .
In addition to the above equations, I estimate attrition and the initial conditions for living
arrangements, savings as well as subjective and functional health transitions. Details on how
these variables are generated in the actual estimation are discussed in the next chapter.
4.3 Estimation Method and Likelihood Function
Despite the rich data available in the HRS, some individual preferences or characteristics
are unobserved by the researcher and are correlated across the dependent variables. For
example, an individual may have a negative attitude towards a nursing home and will insist
on choosing to either live independently or with her children. Because she prefers not being
institutionalized, she may take better care of herself resulting in a better health outcome, save
more such that she has income to support her extended longevity and transfer money to her
children in exchange for a promise that they will not put her in a nursing home when she grows
sicker and older. The negative attitude towards institutionalization is not observed in the data
nor are other time-invariant or time-varying unobservables that may influence all observed
behaviors and health outcomes. If these unobservables are not accounted for, however, they
will lead to biased estimates.
I jointly estimate the equations using the nonlinear discrete factor random effects (DFRE)
method (Mroz, 1999). The DFRE method approximates the distribution of the error terms by
first breaking them up into three components. One of the components (ut) is independently and
identically distributed. The other components, permanent and time-varying heterogeneity (µ
and νt respectively) are correlated across equations and capture information on the individuals
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that is not observed by the researcher. The effects of the heterogeneity terms vary across
the outcomes of interest and, much like the coefficients (α, β, γ, θ, δ, ζ, η, ϕ and κ), they are
parameters to be estimated. The DFRE method assumes the cumulative distribution of the
heterogeneity terms can be approximated by a discrete step function, estimated with points
of support whose number is chosen by the researcher.
The likelihood function for a living individual n’s observed outcomes conditional on unob-
served heterogeneity is given by:
Ln(Λ|µ, νt) =
6∏
j=0
P (LAt = j|µ1j , ν1jt)1[LAnt=j]f(At|µ2, ν2t )
P (IVt = 1|µ3, ν3t )1[IVnt=1](1− P (IVt = 1|µ3, ν3t ))1[IVnt 6=1]g(IV At|µ4, ν4t )
P (Bt = 1|µ5, ν5t )1[Bnt=1](1− P (Bt = 1|µ5, ν5t ))1[Bnt 6=1]
3∏
h=0
P (Ht+1 = h|µ6h, ν6ht)1[Hnt+1=h]
2∏
d=0
P (Dt+1 = d|µ7d, ν7dt)1[Dnt+1=d]
P (Bt+1 = 1|µ8, ν8t )1[Bnt+1=1|Hnt+1=0](1−P (Bt+1 = 1|µ8, ν8t ))1[Bnt+1 6=1|Hnt+1=0]
q(BAt+1|µ9, ν9t ),
where Λ is the vector of parameters to be estimated including (α, β, γ, θ, δ, ζ, η, ϕ and κ).
f(•), g(•) and q(•) are the continuous density functions for savings, the amount of inter vivos
transfers and the amount of bequests respectively. 1[•] is an indicator function.
The contribution of n to the likelihood function unconditional on the unobserved factors
is given by:
Ln(Λ,Φ,Ψ) =
K∑
k=1
Φk
6∏
j=0
P (LAn0 = j|µ1jk)1[LA0=j]f(An0|µ2k)
3∏
h=0
P (Hn1 = h|µ6hk)1[H1=h]
2∏
d=0
P (Dn1 = d|µ7dk)1[D1=d]
Tn∏
t=1
[
M∑
m=1
ΨmLn(Λ|µk, νmt)
]
,
where Φ and Ψ are the joint probability vectors for the K and the M points of support of the
permanent and the time-varying heterogeneity terms respectively. Juxtaposing the conditional
against the unconditional likelihood functions, the DFRE method simply integrates out over
the distribution of the heterogeneity terms. Λ, Φ and Ψ are estimated simultaneously.
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Entering period t = 1, the individual n knows her subjective and functional health state,
her savings and her living arrangement from the previous period. These variables affect the
decisions she makes in period t = 1. However, they cannot be modeled using the dynamic
equations specified above because we do not observe behavior prior to t = 1 in the data.
Therefore reduced-form initial condition equations are needed to explain the initially observed
values of these variables.
The DFRE method is preferred to other estimation techniques. In the face of unobserved
heterogeneity that may be correlated across equations, the error terms cannot be treated as in-
dependently and identically distributed with a known distribution. Outcomes on the left hand
side of the equations are correlated with unobserved preferences and characteristics not cap-
tured in the data. There is an endogeneity bias when the equations are individually estimated
with OLS, logit or multinomial logit with non-iid error terms. Typically, fixed-effect models
are used to account for permanent heterogeneity, but they do not account for the time-varying
heterogeneity and, with the inclusion of individual fixed effects, require more parameters to be
estimated than the DFRE method. Most maximum likelihood estimators assume joint normal-
ity; for the DFRE method, the distributional assumption can be easily relaxed. Mroz (1999)
illustrates that, in terms of precision and bias, the discrete factor approximations perform at
least as well as other efficient estimators including maximum likelihood under normality and
non-normality alike.
4.4 Identification
Identification needs to be established. Theoretically justified exogenous variables enter
the living arrangement, savings, and transfer equations but do not enter the health equations
conditional on the period t behavior. These variables include the average characteristics of
the household’s children, the gift tax variable, prices of care, cost of living variables and
Medicaid eligibility variables. The non-linearities in the functional form of some endogenous
variables provide additional sources of identification. More importantly, the model is identified
through the inclusion of lagged outcomes of health, savings and living arrangement in every
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Table 4.2: Exclusion Restrictions for Initial Conditions
Variables Exclusion Restrictions
Living arrangement (LA0) Medicaid eligibilty variables at t = 0
Savings (A0) Education levels of the parents of the parents at t = 0
Subjective health (H1) County-level health facilities variables at t = 0 (M0)
Functional health (D1) County-level health facilities variables at t = 0 (M0)
specification according to the theoretical model, which are, in turn, functions of exogenous,
time-varying variables. The history of exogenous, time-varying variables differs extensively
across individuals over time. I also need variables in the initial condition equations to provide
identification. Table 4.2 shows the list of exclusion restrictions that I use in estimating the
initial conditions.
Variables included in the RHS of all initial condition equations include a constant, age,
a female indicator, a nonwhite indicator and whether the respondent was born outside the
US. Variables specific to the health equations include the number of doctors per one elderly
individual, the percentage of doctors with medical specialty, the number of hospitals per 1000
elderly individuals, the number of hospital beds per 1000 elderly individuals, the number of
full-time equivalent hospital personnel per hospital divided by 1000 and the ratio of nursing
home personnel to total personnel in each hospital, all at the county level. Most variables are
statistically significant at the 5% level across all categories. When I carry out the overidenti-
fication test, adding the variables at t = 1 to the per-period (t > 1) equations, they become
insignificant, which confirm that the exclusion restrictions are valid instruments. I also perform
the F tests for the initial health equations and find that the instruments are jointly significant.
The F test statistics for the subjective health equation and the functional health equation are
828.50 and 1005.49 respectively.
There are two LA0 equations and two A0 equations, separated by whether or not the
parent is married. In the living arrangement initial conditions, I include state-specific Medicaid
income and asset limits at time t = 0 as well as the house price index and the gas price index.
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In the savings initial conditions, the explanatory variables include education levels of the
father and the mother of the parents and their spouses, when applicable. At least one or
more of the variables are statistically significant at the 5% level across all categories and the
overidentification tests show that they are valid instruments. Also, the F test statistics on
the living arrangement and the savings equations for married and unmarried households are
1497.78, 694.79, 175.20 and 78.51 respectively. Their large values indicate that the exclusion
restrictions are jointly significant.
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Chapter 5
Data and Sample Selection
In this chapter, I describe the source and the nature of data. I discuss the sample and
describe the variables used in estimation and their summary statistics.
5.1 Data Sources
Data used in this study are drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the
Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old Study (AHEAD), collected by the Institute
of Social Research at the University of Michigan. HRS and AHEAD studies are longitudinal
studies that focus on the economic, health, marital and family status of older Americans,
while over-sampling blacks, Hispanics and Florida residents. The first interview for HRS was
conducted in 1992 and every two years thereafter. The first interview for AHEAD took place
in 1993, then in 1995, 1998 and every two years thereafter. HRS and AHEAD were merged in
1998 and are collectively known as HRS.
This study includes public-use and restricted-use data mainly from the 1995-2006 waves of
AHEAD and HRS. The public-use data contain information on demographics, health status,
cognition measures, family structure, health, health care utilization, assets, income and expec-
tations of older individuals as well as information on their children and helpers’ characteristics.
The restricted-use data include state and county identifiers of each survey respondent. I use
both core (living respondents) and exit (deceased respondents) interviews. I also use some
information from the 2008 wave, namely, subjective and functional health states into which
the respondents transitioned at the end of the last period (including death), whether the re-
spondents made a bequest to any children, conditional on their death in the last period and
the bequest values. The Identification Tracker, Master Identification and Longitudinal Other
Person Number files are included to uniquely identify each respondent and child across time.
The HRS data contain respondents from five birth cohorts. The HRS cohort, first in-
terviewed in 1992, consists of people who were born between 1931 and 1941. The AHEAD
cohort, first interviewed in 1993, consists of individuals born in 1923 or earlier. The War Baby
(WB) cohort (born between 1942 and 1947) and the Children of the Depression (CODA) co-
hort (born between 1924 and 1930) were first interviewed in 1998. The Early Baby Boomers
(EBB) cohort (born between 1948 and 1953) was first interviewed in 2004. The term ‘cohort’
refers to individuals who were born during the respective periods and their younger spouses.
A household that is composed of a couple, one born in 1921 and the other in 1932, would find
both individuals grouped into the AHEAD cohort; the year in which the older of the couple
was born determines the cohort they are in.
Instead of using the entire HRS dataset which includes five cohorts and covers the years
1992-2006, I discard the 1992, 1993 and 1994 waves and the EBB cohort. The 1992 and 1994
waves are discarded because they have no information on the provision of informal care and
the receipt of formal home care. Important variables such as the intention to leave a bequest
and who are transfer beneficiaries are also missing. The 1993 wave is left out because some
of the wealth variables reported in the wave seem to suffer a measurement error bias (Juster
and Smith, 1997); their summary statistics are different from those in the subsequent waves
for reasons other than inflation. The EBB cohort is too short to meaningfully capture the
dynamics of the decisions that I wish to study.
In addition to HRS, I obtain data from other sources to account for differences in the
costs of different living arrangement alternatives and to provide identification to the model.
Information on the costs of nursing home care and formal home care comes from the 1997-
2001 Nursing Facility Sourcebooks and 2000-2006 Metlife Market Surveys. Information on
the costs of living alone versus living apart from one’s children may be captured by house
price indices which are available on the Office of Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)
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website and the price of gasoline per gallon, which can be found in Petroleum Marketing
Annual from the US Energy Information Administration. The Area Resource File from the
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) provides information on the number of
doctors, nurses, hospitals, nursing facilities, hospices, population, personal income and median
household income in each county in 1995-2006. The Statistical Abstract on the US Census
Bureau website, the 1997-2001 Nursing Facility Sourcebook on the American Health Care
Association website, articles from the Urban Institute and Purcell (2009) complement the
Area Resource File, filling in some of the missing information albeit at the state (as opposed
to county) level.
Medicaid eligibility variables for the years 1995-1996 are from Garrett and Glied (2000),
Gardner and Gilleskie (2009) and various articles from Social Security Bulletin. For the years
1998-2000, I obtain these data from Bruen et al. (1999), Schneider et al. (1999), Kassner and
Shirley (2000) and Stone (2002). Medicaid eligibility data for the years 2002-2006 are rela-
tively sparse, coming from Bruen et al. (2003), Levy et al. (2005), Stone (2008), the National
Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center (NORC), the National Association of Medicaid
Directors (NASMD) website, various articles from the Kaiser Family Foundation, the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS), the US Bureau of the Census, the US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS), the National Conference of State Legislatures
and information provided on state Medicaid websites. My direct contact with state Medicaid
offices fills in some of the blanks in the missing Medicaid data in 2002-20061. The number of
Medicaid beneficiaries and Medicaid expenditures, categorized by eligibility statuses and med-
ical services received (nursing home versus home and community-based services) in 1998-2006
1Through telephone conversations and emails to the state Medicaid office of all 50 contiguous states plus the
District of Columbia, I received complete responses from 20 states, including Alaska, Colorada, Connecticut,
the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. For
states that did not respond to my information request, I imputed their Medicaid information based on other
available sources. For example, even though I did not receive information directly from the North Carolina
Medicaid Office, Stone (2002) suggests that their asset standards were 2000 for singles and 3000 for couples in
2000 and a report on the Kaiser Family Foundation website states that the standards remained the same in
2009. I would deduce from these two sources that the asset standards for North Carolina were 2000 and 3000
for singles and couples respectively in the years 2002-2006.
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come from the National Medicaid Statistical Information System State Summary (MSIS) Ta-
bles, Thomson Reuters (previously Medstat), articles on the Kaiser Family Foundation website
and Ellis and Smith (2000).
5.2 Sample Selection
I select my sample based on two criteria. First, interviewed respondents included must have
information about their children2 , and states of residence. Respondents who report having
living children but do not have child-level information (such that children’s characteristics, the
provision of informal care and amounts of inter vivos transfers and bequests are missing) are
excluded. Second, I include only respondents who have constant household compositions. My
sample contains only respondents who are either unmarried the entire time, married to the
same spouse the entire time, married to the same spouse who eventually died or those who died
themselves. In cases where a respondent was previously married to a deceased respondent and
is now married to a different person, HRS would contain information on the living respondent,
the deceased respondent and the living respondent’s new spouse. I consider only the living
respondent’s and the deceased respondent’s information and do not follow the living spouse
thereafter.
My reasoning for the second sample selection criterion is as follows. Given the nature
of the data, within a given household, there is a wide variation of household compositions:
respondents who were unmarried the entire time; respondents who were married to the same
spouse the entire time; respondents who were married to a spouse who died within the period
studied and who did not remarry; respondents who were married to a spouse who died within
the period studied and remarried; respondents who were married to a spouse, divorced the
spouse and then married a new spouse; respondents who divorced the old spouse, married a
new spouse, divorced the new spouse and did not remarry thereafter; respondents who divorced
the old spouse, remarried and then divorced the new spouse and then married yet another new
2Children of the household are observations that could be identified as children, stepchildren, spouses of
children and stepchildren and grandchildren who were alive at the time of the interview and older than 18. I
do not include professional helpers, parents and siblings of the respondent as household members.
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spouse; and respondents who divorced the old spouse, remarried and then divorced the new
spouse to be reunited with the old spouse.
The introduction of new spouses at any point in time changes the information of the original
respondents from the perspective of the researcher. As an example, consider a household where
the male respondent divorced the original wife and remarried while the wife did not remarry.
According to HRS, the male respondent would find children of the new spouse added as his
children too. At the household level, where wealth and monetary transfer data are contained,
his wealth and his monetary transfers would now be combined with the new spouse’s. The
original wife’s information would be changed at the household level, her wealth reduced due
to the separation and her monetary transfers no longer made in consultation with her now
ex-husband. Living arrangements of the two original respondents will be affected because the
composition of children who may coreside with either of the respondents changes due to the
stepchildren addition. The information of the two original respondents before and after the
divorce is significantly different. It is clear that complications that arise from the inclusion of
new spouses have the potential to confound the analysis and take away from the focus of the
paper. Therefore, I exclude these households.
To investigate the impact of the exclusion of households with unstable compositions, I
compare the data retained with the data discarded. I conduct the pairwise t-tests of the
summary statistics for every variable used in estimation. The comparison is shown in Appendix
C. Because none of the variables are statistically different across the two sets of data, I conclude
that my sample is representative of the population and that the exclusion of households with
unstable compositions can be justified.
In summary, the final sample is based on the 1995-2006 waves of HRS and includes four
cohorts: AHEAD, HRS, CODA and WB. The first wave in which AHEAD respondents were
introduced into the sample is 1995 (which is the period on which the initial conditions for the
cohort are modeled). The first wave in which HRS respondents entered the sample is 1996
and it is 1998 for CODA and WB respondents. The respondents included have child-level
information and a constant marriage pattern. Table 5.1 describes the evolution of the number
of observations contained in each cohort over time. The difference between one year and the
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Table 5.1: Progression of Number of Respondents in Sample
Cohort 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Total
Attrition 828 813 652 490 318 3101
Attrition Rate 6.51% 5.57% 5.04% 4.28% 3.14% 5.02%
Deceased 838 1012 818 858 813 4339
Observations in Sample 17256 15590 13765 12295 10947 69853
next represents the number of respondents who left the sample by the end of the period or died.
Attrition is defined by the number of living respondents who stopped providing information or
who had incomplete information on the endogenous variables in the following year3 . I model
attrition jointly with the outcomes of interest to test whether attrition is a random process.
5.3 Data Description and Summary Statistics
The summary statistics are provided in Table 5.2- Table 5.5. The tables show the mean
value of each variable and its standard error or the frequency of each category’s occurrence,
in the case of health and living arrangements. Table 5.2 shows the evolution of the depen-
dent (endogenous) variables across time, starting from 1998. Table 5.3 shows the dependent
variables by marital status. Table 5.4 describes independent variables. It shows household
characteristics, including those of the respondents, their spouses and average values of their
children’s characteristics. Table 5.5 shows exogenous factors that may affect the monetary
transfer behavior of the elderly, the costs of different living arrangements (including the costs
of care), measures of state generosity and the county-level availability of health facilities that
could affect health outcomes4 . The variables explained in this section correspond to the
empirical framework.
3I know who left the sample by the end of 2006 because I use health information from the 2008 wave. The
respondents who did not report their subjective or functional health and who were not reported deceased in
2008 are deemed as having left the sample in 2006.
4As a reminder, I do not model the decision to marry, to work, to have a health insurance coverage (including
Medicaid) nor the decision to locate in a particular area. The model assumes these decisions to be exogenous.
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5.3.1 Endogenous Variables
The living arrangement categories are divided as follows. I assign the nursing home ar-
rangement to parents who reported currently living in a nursing home. If the parents had
children, stepchildren, children-in-law or grandchildren over the age of 18 living with them, I
assign them the intergenerational coresidence status and the independent living status other-
wise. Parents are treated as receiving formal home care if there is an identifiable professional
helper in the data or if they reported having had visits or in-home services from professional
helpers. Parents who received help with ADLs and/or IADLs from identifiable adult children
are treated as receiving informal care5 . Savings or bequeathable wealth includes non-housing
assets and earnings of both the respondent and his/her spouse6 .
Parents are treated as having made an inter vivos transfer if their adult children (aged over
18) reported having received a financial transfer from them. The amount of inter vivos transfers
is the sum of all inter vivos transfers made within the two-year period to all identifiable adult
children divided by the number of children in the household. Bequest intent takes the value
of 1 if the respondent had adult children whom they identified as potential bequest recipients
and 0 otherwise. Also, respondents may have made a bequest arrangement that was realized
after their death and would be assigned a 1 in the actual bequest decision if any of their adult
children were named beneficiaries. The value of bequests is the total value of bequests given
to all identifiable adult children divided by the number of children in the household.
Health is represented by reported subjective health and functional health. Most people
in the sample reported having good or fair health and no disability. The percentages of each
category are consistent across time. The percentage of the elderly having worse subjective
5Note that I do not include spousal care as part of informal care. The information on spousal care in HRS is
unavailable in 1995, 1996 and 1998. Instead I assume that, for married households, living with no care involves
some spousal care.
6Savings equal to the sum of values of real estate, businesses, IRA or KEOGH accounts, stocks, bonds, savings
or checking accounts or money market funds, CDs and T-bills, vehicles, trust funds, lump sum payments from,
for instance, inheritances or insurance settlements and earned incomes of the parent and his or her spouse minus
debts and mortgages. Earned income comes from self-employment, wages, professional practice, tips, bonuses or
commission, worker’s compensation and unemployment compensation. Savings exclude Social Security income,
Supplemental Security Income, veteran benefits, pensions and purchased annuities (all of which are part of the
household’s annuitized income instead).
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and functional health increases as the sample grew older. The living arrangement category
with the highest frequency is independent living with no care, which accounts for 67% of the
sample, consistent with the existing literature. The living arrangement categories with the
lowest frequencies are intergenerational coresidence with formal home care and nursing home
care. Savings increase over time, partly due to inflation and because those with low savings
may have attrited. The bequest and inter vivos transfer variables are consistent across time.
They could be considered as low; it could be a result of the way these variables are constructed.
If and only if identifiable adult children received any of these transfers would these variables
have a value other than zero. Based on the way I create my transfer variables, about 33% of
the respondents made a positive inter vivos transfer and about 50% named their adult children
as bequest benefiaries.
Table 5.3 shows that there are notable differences between married and unmarried house-
holds. About 70% of married households in the sample lived independently, while only about
55% of unmarried households did so. The percentage of unmarried respondents in a nursing
home is also almost sixfold the percentage of married respondents with the same mode of liv-
ing. The comparison implies a heavy reliance on spousal care if/when care is needed. Savings
for married households are approximately twice as large as those for unmarried households; it
is expected due to the difference in the composition of the two types of households.
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5.3.2 Household Characteristics
The term ‘household’ here is used loosely to refer to the elderly parents and their adult
children, regardless of whether or not they live together under one roof. The characteristics
of the elderly parents, their spouses and mean characteristics of their children are consistent
across time. The amount of annuitized income in the table is at the household level, and
the amount for each individual (not shown) is quite constant across time. Age increases by
an average more than one year as time progresses. Variables that are permanent across time
such as gender and whether the respondent was born outside the US stagnate as they should.
The variable ‘spouse information missing’ takes the value of one if the respondent is married
yet no one can be identified as her spouse in the data of the same interview wave and zero
otherwise. The characteristics of children in the households are averages or percentages. This
corresponds to the theoretical framework where one child is assumed and should be contrasted
with models such as Hiedemann and Stern (1999), where the focus is on the strategic play
among siblings making care decisions about their parents, in which case information on each
child individually is necessary.
HRS contains incomplete information on child-level characteristics and I correct for it. In
particular, the HRS does not contain information on the children-in-law in 1998 and 2000. I
use the available information in 2002, 2004 and 2006 to identify those whose information is
missing in 1998 and 2000. If the elderly’s children were married in 1998 or in 2000 and were
also married in either 2002, 2004 or 2006, I assume they were married to the same spouse and
merge the information of the spouse(s) available in the later years to the earlier years7 .
Table D.3 in Appendix D compares three sets of child-level information that can be used.
The first set of summary statistics comes from when I take the information from the HRS
as given and do not correct for the missing information on the children-in-law in 1998 and
2000. The second set is when I drop the children-in-law altogether. The final set is when
I correct for the missing information on the children-in-law. I estimated the model without
7I used the Longitudinal Tracker numbers, which are assigned to each child and child-in-law and remain the
same across years, to link children and children-in-law over time.
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Table 5.4: Summary Statistics of Household Characteristics across Time
Variables 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Personal characteristics
Annuitized Income∗10−4 2.865 3.336 3.835 4.428 3.276
(2-year period) (3.290) (4.362) (5.172) (7.212) (1.932)
Age 66.158 67.522 69.002 70.286 71.589
(10.815) (10.458) (10.087) (9.685) (9.292)
Female 0.586 0.592 0.597 0.603 0.607
(0.493) (0.491) (0.491) (0.489) (0.488)
Nonwhite 0.161 0.161 0.155 0.153 0.153
(0.367) (0.367) (0.362) (0.360) (0.359)
Born outside US 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.084
(0.280) (0.278) (0.277) (0.276) (0.277)
Married 0.701 0.685 0.677 0.670 0.659
(0.457) (0.465) (0.468) (0.471) (0.474)
Divorced 0.078 0.079 0.075 0.072 0.071
(0.269) (0.271) (0.263) (0.259) (0.256)
Widowed 0.209 0.224 0.241 0.249 0.262
(0.407) (0.417) (0.427) (0.432) (0.439)
Single 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.107) (0.108) (0.091) (0.094) (0.089)
Number of adult children 5.746 5.934 5.745 5.816 5.974
(3.509) (3.518) (3.326) (3.305) (3.348)
Education (years) 11.930 12.011 12.101 12.179 12.247
(3.337) (3.319) (3.276) (3.233) (3.210)
On Medicaid 0.081 0.089 0.086 0.092 0.090
(0.273) (0.285) (0.281) (0.289) (0.286)
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Table 5.4 (Continued)
Variables 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Spousal characteristics
Spouse info missing, if married 0.013 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.113) (0.096) (0.085) (0.081) (0.078)
Spouse age 63.78 65.42 66.88 68.23 69.41
(9.760) (9.691) (9.287) (8.924) (8.563)
Spouse nonwhite 0.127 0.125 0.121 0.118 0.114
(0.332) (0.330) (0.326) (0.322) (0.318)
Spouse education (years) 12.29 12.34 12.43 12.52 12.59
(3.118) (3.118) (3.088) (3.076) (3.039)
Spouse on Medicaid 0.030 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.035
(0.171) (0.188) (0.185) (0.061) (0.183)
Child characteristics
Mean age of children 39.20 40.54 41.99 43.53 44.64
(9.915) (9.612) (9.266) (9.053) (8.784)
% female children 0.502 0.503 0.499 0.503 0.502
(0.173) (0.157) (0.155) (0.147) (0.142)
% married children 0.680 0.686 0.688 0.691 0.685
(0.307) (0.305) (0.318) (0.315) (0.311)
Mean number of grandchildren 1.603 1.604 1.681 1.727 1.798
(1.106) (1.098) (1.043) (1.041) (1.023)
% children who are stepchildren 0.074 0.071 0.071 0.069 0.071
(0.174) (0.165) (0.167) (0.161) (0.160)
% children who are in-laws 0.359 0.381 0.368 0.388 0.391
(0.181) (0.163) (0.154) (0.147) (0.141)
Mean education of children 13.477 13.536 13.579 13.638 13.671
(2.273) (2.192) (2.206) (2.162) (2.147)
% children who work 0.803 0.809 0.804 0.804 0.811
(0.249) (0.237) (0.243) (0.236) (0.232)
% children who live within 10 miles 0.198 0.177 0.209 0.213 0.197
(0.263) (0.254) (0.277) (0.275) (0.259)
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unobserved heterogeneity using all possible sets of child-level information and found that,
despite the differences in the summary statistics, the coefficient estimates are similar in sign
and significance across all three data sets. I choose to use the final set of child-level information
in the analysis because it provides a more complete picture of household formation. Data in
2002-2006 clearly suggest that some children-in-law do provide informal care and receive inter
vivos transfers from the parents.
5.3.3 Exogenous Variables: Transfer Policy
The tax incentive variable , τ IV At , is represented by the tax-exclusion threshold. It refers to
the maximum amount of monetary transfers that an individual can give to her adult children
and grandchildren within a two-year period without paying transfer taxes according to the
annual exclusion threshold. This is obtained by multiplying the annual exclusion threshold
by the number of adult children and grandchildren in the family. The amount doubles if the
respondent is married8 . The annual and lifetime exclusion amounts for a single household in
1992-2006 are provided in Appendix B.
5.3.4 Exogenous Variables: Costs of Living
Factors affecting costs of living are denoted as P ILt and P
IC
t in the model. These costs
are not readily available (and difficult to measure). But they may be proxied by house price
indices and gas prices as well as other factors under personal characteristics that indicate the
household make-up e.g., whether or not the parent has a living spouse, the number of children
the household has and the number of grandchildren. The house price indices are available
across states and in all years. They increase over time with the base quarter being the first
quarter in 1980. The gas price is in cents per gallon and excludes excise duties.
8I do not incorporate the difference in gift tax rates in different states. Joulfaian (2007) in his extensive
review of the gift tax economics-based literature finds no evidence that differing gift tax rates have an impact
on the transfer behavior and people do not relocate to lower tax states.
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5.3.5 Exogenous Variables: Costs and Availability of Care
There are three types of care in the model: informal care, formal home care and nursing
home care. Average characteristics of adult children, XKt , account for the cost of informal care,
P It , including, for instance, their education (indicative of the opportunity costs of informal care
for adult children) and the percentage of children who live within 10 miles (which represents
costs of informal care for adult children who do not coreside with their parents). The costs
of formal home care and nursing home care, PFt and P
N
t respectively, include average daily
cost of home care, average daily cost of assisted living facility, hourly wage of home health
aides9 and the cost of living in a private nursing home at the state level. I also include the
availability of formal home care providers and nursing home facilities at the county level to
measure the ease of receiving such types of care. Some of these variables are per 1000 elderly
(i.e., individuals over 65 years of age).
5.3.6 Exogenous Variables: Measures of State Generosity
I include a time-varying, state-specific set of variables that represent the thresholds for
means-tested public programs (Qsmt ). I focus on Medicaid since it has the potential to reduce
the costs of care, thus the costs of living arrangements and encourages individuals to choose
one living arrangement over the others. Medicare is universally provided and in a sample
where most respondents are older than 65, its impact is not likely to be distinct and is left out
of the analysis. I extend the meaning of Qsmt to include not just Medicaid eligibility rules but
also supply restrictions and Medicaid benefits received by each qualified individual. I denote
Q
sm
t collectively as measures of state generosity.
Measures of state generosity are constructed according to Medicaid rules. An elderly
individual can receive Medicaid benefits while living outside of a nursing home (i.e., in a
community, receiving home and community-based services (HCBS)) or while in a nursing
9Formal home care costs are incomplete in the data. The daily cost of home care is missing in 2002, 2004
and 2006. The daily cost of assisted living facility is missing in 1998 and 2000. The hourly wage of home health
aide is missing in 1998. I extrapolate these missing data from the available data in the closest years, weighted
by CPIU and COLA.
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home (NH). Medicaid sets different income limits depending on where the individual lives. The
income limit for those already in a nursing home is typically higher. The asset limits of the two
living arrangements are usually the same but they differ by the individual’s marital status. If
the applying individual is single or if she is married but her spouse does not apply for Medicaid,
she is subjected to one resource limit. If the individual is married and the spouse applies for
Medicaid too, the household faces another resource limit. In cases where the individual is
married and receives Medicaid benefits while institutionalized, the Medicaid-ineligible spouse
will have her assets protected by the state’s spousal impoverishment rules. If the Medicaid-
eligibile person is married but receives benefits at home, the spousal impoverishment rules need
not apply. If both individuals in the same household receive Medicaid benefits, one is deemed
the community spouse and the spousal impoverishment rules apply. A detailed discussion on
Medicaid is provided in Appendix A.
To measure how strict each state is in allowing the spending down of incomes, I create a
variable called the income cap/Miller trust existence variable. It takes the value of one if the
respondent lived in a state where an Income Cap or a Miller trust existed and zero otherwise.
The Miller trust allows individuals who have more income than the Medicaid income limit to
transfer their rights to income sources such as pension and social security to the trust in order
for them to qualify. The summary statistics of this variable seem to be inconsistent across
time. I explain the inconsistencies in Table D.4 in Appendix D.
To account for the two Medicaid income limits facing each individual: one for HCBS and
the other for NH benefits, I create two variables representing the percentages of income that the
individual would need to dispose of in order to be eligible for Medicaid. The variables differ by
the type of benefits received. The percentages equal to one minus the ratio of the maximum
income limit for the respective type of Medicaid benefits in each state to the respondent’s
income. They take the value of zero if the individual is already qualified for Medicaid.
To account for the two potential Medicaid asset limits facing each individual: one for singles
and the other for couples, I create two variables that represent the percentages of assets that
single or married households would need to lose if they were to qualify for Medicaid. If the
individual is single and already qualifies for Medicaid, the ‘percentage of assets that would be
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lost if on Medicaid (for singles)’ is assigned the value of zero. If the individual is single and does
not qualify for Medicaid, the percentage equals one minus the resource limit for singles over
the assets that she brings in from the last period. If the individual is married and ineligible
for Medicaid, the percentage equals to one minus the resource limit for singles over half of the
household’s previous period assets. The ‘percentage of assets that would be lost if on Medicaid
for married couples’ equals one minus the resource limit for couples over the household’s total
assets if she is married. The variable takes the value of zero if the individual is not married
and if the individual and her spouse are both on Medicaid. These variables represent the ease
of receiving Medicaid in each state, felt by each individual according to their incomes, assets
and marital status.
Married individuals may care about impoverishing their spouses in events of being eligible
for Medicaid. The spousal impoverishment rules apply to all married couples regardless of
whether no one receives Medicaid, one receives Medicaid or both do. When neither of the
couple is on Medicaid or when one is on Medicaid, the households face the same concern that
if/when one receives Medicaid benefits, the ineligible spouse will have an amount of assets
taken away by the state to finance the medical costs incurred by the household’s Medicaid
recipient. When the couple are both on Medicaid, only one but not both will be deemed the
ineligible or ‘community’ spouse and have an amount of assets taken away. The ‘percentages
of asset loss if spouse qualifies for NH and for HCBS’ are equal to one minus the maximum
spousal impoverishment asset limit for the respective type of Medicaid benefits over half the
couple’s previous period assets. The variables take on the value of zero if the respondent is
unmarried. The higher these percentages, the less likely an individual wants to become eligible
for Medicaid; she needs to dispose of more of her spouse’s wealth to receive public benefits10 .
In addition to eligibility variables, I include indicators representing whether the state had
in place any Certificate-of-Needs (CON) laws on home health services, assisted living facilities,
long-term care facilities and hospices. The CON programs are used to regulate the number of
10Note that in 1998 the CODA and WB cohorts just entered the sample, so they do not have any information
on most of the state generosity variables then. The summary statistics of those variables in 1998 are based on
the AHEAD and HRS cohorts only.
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beds and prevent overbuying of expensive equipment; the need for new facilities or equipment
has to be approved based on a genuine need in a community and what are deemed most
urgent needs are approved first. The existence of CON laws represents state-implemented
supply restrictions. I also include the ratio of total spending on home and community-based
services to total spending on nursing homes by the Medicaid program in each state. The
variable measures the extent to which each state encourages community living relative to
institutionalization, the latter of which is more draining to the state budget.
The last set of variables representing state generosity is relevant only to those already
qualified for Medicaid. They take the value of zero for individuals ineligible for Medicaid.
‘Expected benefits’ equal the probability of receiving a particular type of Medicaid benefits
(HCBS or nursing home) multiplied by the private cost of such care. The probability of
receiving each type of care is the number of beneficiaries for each type of care divided by
the number of total Medicaid recipients in each state at time t. Because it is not possible to
calculate the actual private cost of formal home care11 , I use the average amount of state
spending that the average HCBS recipient receives (equal to the total HCBS spending divided
by the total number of HCBS beneficiaries in each state at time t). The private cost of nursing
home care is the actual private cost of nursing home care for the two-year period. The variables
measure expected discounts of different types of living arrangement provided by the state.
5.3.7 Exogenous Variables: Health Related Area Characteristics
Denoted by Mt in the empirical framework, health-related area characteristics include
county-level health facility variables: the number of active MDs, the percentage of doctors with
medical specialty, the number of hospitals, the number of hospital beds, the number of full-
time equivalent (FTE) hospital personnel and the percentage of hospital personnel devoted to
nursing home care in each hospital. These variables represent the supply of health services and
may impact subjective or functional health. Their summary statistics are relatively constant
11Home health care can take many forms, including hiring a medical professional, a home health aide, a
homemaker or a licensed practical nurse to provide in-home services or residing in an assisted living community.
The frequency of receiving home health care categorized by type of care providers is also unknown in the data.
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across years.
5.3.8 Exogenous Variables: Wealth Related Area Characteristics
Measures of community-level wealth include the percentage of unemployed people, the
percentage of people below the poverty line and median household income at the county level.
These variables provide indirect measures of the costs of living and to a certain extent may
represent the number of people who would be eligible for Medicaid benefits in the area.
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Chapter 6
Results
I jointly estimate equations for living arrangements for married and unmarried households,
savings (bequeathable wealth) for married and unmarried households, the probability and the
amount of inter vivos transfers for married and unmarried households, bequest intent, subjec-
tive health, functional health, the probability and the amount of actual bequests conditional
on the elderly’s death1 . I also estimate the initial condition equations for subjective health,
functional health, living arrangements and savings as well as attrition. Estimation results
with unobserved heterogeneity are provided in Appendix E. The number of mass points for
permanent unobserved heterogeneity and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity are 3 and 2
1I also experimented with variations of the model. In particular, I jointly estimated:
1) all the above equations except functional health;
2) all the above equations but replacing functional health and subjective health with one ‘health’ variable
such that the categories would be excellent health with no disability, excellent health with moderate disability
and so on;
3) all the above equations except bequest intent (since it could be superfluous);
4) Model 1 and 2 without bequest intent;
5) all the above equations with lagged transfer and lagged bequest intent in all of the equations except
functional health and subjective health, as well as estimating the initial conditions for inter vivos transfers and
bequest intent.
The logic behind choosing the model that is presented is as follows. Functional health is clearly statistically
significant in all of the equations, which rules out Model 1. Some of the bins in Model 2 are too small to
be identifiable and the coefficient estimates of these categories as right hand side variables are not always
interpretable.
Bequest intent is important in the theoretical model since it measures the extent to which bequests are
valued to the parents who I do not observe dying in the data. Leaving the variable out may affect the estimated
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. This rules out Model 3 and 4.
The question on whether lagged transfers and bequest intent should be included in the specifications depends
on whether transfers affect living arrangements contemporaneously or they have impact that is carried over
into the future. I follow the existing literature (as seen in the earlier chapters) and argue that it is the former,
which rules out Model 5.
respectively2 .
To arrive at the optimal number of mass points for the distribution of unobserved hetero-
geneity, I start with one mass point for both permanent and time-varying unobserved hetero-
geneity and gradually increase the number of mass points for each unobserved heterogeneity
type. I perform a test to see if an increase in the number of mass points statistically improves
the log-likelihood value. I also check the probability weights of the unobserved heterogeneity
terms. Part of the stopping rule is to see whether the probability weight of the additional mass
point is close to zero, in which case adding more mass points no longer improves the model.
Table E.8 shows unobserved heterogeneity parameters and the probability weight of each mass
point.
I include in every specification time trend, time trend squared divided by 100, time trend
cubed divided by 1000, cohort dummies (with the excluded category being AHEAD), and
some race and gender interaction terms. In the living arrangements, savings, inter vivos
transfers and bequest intent equations, I also include interaction terms between each of the
living arrangements and lagged percentage of children living within 10 miles of the parent.
These interaction terms are not shown. However, they are generally significant across all
specifications. The asterisk in the tables marks a statistical significance at the 10% level and
the double asterisk at the 5% level.
The model with unobserved heterogeneity is preferred to one without unobserved hetero-
geneity because it accounts for correlated errors across the equations. The model without
unobserved heterogeneity (not shown) seems to overestimate the impact of endogeneous ex-
planatory variables in the health, living arrangement and savings equations and underestimate
them in the inter vivos transfers and bequest equations.
2The coefficients reported in the tables correspond to estimation with starting values of zero. As an experi-
ment, I also change the starting values to 80% of the coefficients of the model without unobserved heterogeneity
and find that the probability weights remain the same, while the coefficients vary only slightly.
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6.1 Fit of the Model
To evaluate how well the model fits the observed outcomes, I compare the actual propor-
tions and values of the dependent variables in the data to their corresponding predicted values.
To find the predicted values, I categorize the right hand side variables into two broad groups:
exogenous explanatory variables and endogenous explanatory variables. Using the coefficient
estimates in Appendix E, I simulate outcomes from a model that controls for unobserved het-
erogeneity. I update the endogenous variables sequentially such that period t realizations of
these variables influence period t+1 outcomes3 , integrating over the unobserved heterogeneity.
For the purpose of showing the fit of the model, I also allow the simulated sample to attrit
from the second period onward like in the observed data4 . I perform 50 replications of each
individual and average the outcomes over all observations in the simulated sample5 .
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 show the comparison between the actual and the predicted values
3Note that the savings variable in my model is log savings. There are some variables that are based on
lagged savings but in levels (as opposed to log values), namely state generosity variables that are related to
percentages of wealth that the elderly would need to dispose of if they were to be eligible for Medicaid. In
the updating process, I transform log values into levels to recreate these state generosity variables. Since
there are a number of ways to retransform log values, I experiment with 1) the assumption of lognormal
distribution with homoskedasticity where the smearing factor is e(0.5σ
2); 2) a nonparametric smearing factor
following Duan (1983) and Buntin and Zaslavsky (2004) where the smearing factor is the average exponentiated
residual from the savings regression; and 3) a simple exponentiation with no smearing correction. The first
two smearing correction methods produce predicted values that more closely resemble the data than the simple
exponentiation, as expected. The simple exponentiation tends to underpredict savings and inter vivos transfers
in log values, while the residual-based smearing correction tends to overpredict them. Therefore I use the
homoskedastic log normal smearing factor.
4Those who in the observed data might have attrited are simulated and retained over time and they are more
likely to come from one end of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution that may have certain characteristics,
for example, poor health or low savings, etc. Including attrition observations in the simulation could impact
the overall fit of the model.
5In Table F.1 and Table F.2 in Appendix F, I show how well different simulations fit the data. In the first
simulation, I simulate a model without unobserved heterogeneity and do not update the endogenous variables
over time. In the second simulation, I simulate a model with unobserved heterogeneity and do not update the
endogenous variables over time. In the third simulation, I simulate the model without unobserved heterogeneity
and update the endogenous variables based on the predicted outcomes from the previous period. In the fourth
simulation, I simulate the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity and update the endogenous variables
sequentially over time. In the final simulation, I simulate the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity,
update the endogenous variables sequentially and also simulate attrition from the second period onward. The
results suggest that the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity has small effects on the predicted outcomes of
living arrangements. However, Table E.8 suggests that the impact of unobserved heterogeneity may be more
visible in the health, savings and intergenerational transfer outcomes, since the UH terms are statistically
significant.
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Table 6.1: Fit of the Model by Marital Status
Variables Married Households Unmarried Households
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Living arrangement
- % nursing home 0.94 0.91 5.80 5.31
- % coresident, formal home care 1.13 1.13 3.77 3.27
- % coresident, informal care 1.94 1.88 5.33 5.21
- % coresident, no care 16.19 15.99 17.40 17.95
- % independent, formal home care 4.61 4.57 8.08 7.65
- % independent, informal care 2.54 2.47 5.29 4.82
- % independent, no care 72.66 73.06 54.33 55.79
ln(savings) 11.363 11.294 8.871 9.742
% Any inter vivos transfer 36.86 36.43 25.33 26.11
ln(amount of inter vivos transfers) 6.730 6.804 6.764 6.700
of the dependent variables based on the simulation. Overall, the model fits the data well. For
all of the logit-type endogenous variables (ones with percentages reported in the tables), the
simulated values are within two percentage points of the observed values and for the continuous
variables, they are within one log value.
To show how well the model explains the dynamics of living arrangements, Table 6.3 - Table
6.6 illustrate the living arrangement transitions of married households and unmarried house-
holds based on the actual sample and the simulated sample respectively. I define transitions
as a move from a living arrangement in period t to another in period t+ 1.
The model seems to capture the dynamics of living arrangements quite well. While the
percentages of the switches are not the same between the actual and the simulated sample,
they are often close and the rankings of the switches are similar in most cases. In both
samples, regardless of their marital status, individuals often stick to their living arrangements
from the earlier period. Most of the movements in the living arrangements over time are
attributed to changes in the need for care. The percentages of individuals living independently
regardless of their care requirement and of those living with adult children regardless of their
care requirement are relatively constant.
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Table 6.2: Fit of the Model: Full Sample
Variables Actual Predicted
Subjective health
- % excellent/very good 36.41 35.77
- % good/fair 49.33 50.94
- % poor 8.86 8.17
- % deceased 5.40 5.12
Functional health
- % no disabilty 75.87 74.16
- % moderate disability 17.46 18.61
- % severe disability 6.67 7.23
% Bequest intent 48.63 47.67
% Leave bequests upon death 11.11 10.87
ln(value of bequests) 6.207 6.132
The living arrangements that involve no care are most stable across time. Approximately
90% of married individuals and 80% of unmarried individuals who live independently with no
care in period t continue to do so in period t+1. Regardless of their marital status, over 65%
of individuals who live with adult children and receive no care from them stay in the same
arrangement over time. The move from intergenerational coresidence with no care to living
independently with no care is more frequently observed than the other way round, which
indicates that living with adult children is a temporary arrangement for some households,
especially when no care is involved. The percentages of individuals who live with no care
in period t and move into an institution in period t + 1 are also the lowest among all living
arrangements, as expected. They are less than 1% among married households and around 2%
for unmarried households.
There is more movement for the living arrangements that involve care over time. Among
married individuals who live independently and receive informal or formal home care in period
t, they are likely to either receive the same type of care or receive no care in period t + 1.
Unmarried households that live independently with informal care are most likely to stick with
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the same arrangement, and when they receive formal home care in period t, they are most
likely to receive no care in t+1. However, when households live with adult children and receive
informal or formal home care in the earlier period, they are most likely to stick with the same
arrangements in general. Institutionalized individuals often stay in the same arrangement.
Approximately 50% of married households and 80% of unmarried households continue living
in a nursing home over time. When the elderly no longer stay in a nursing home, they either
live independently with no care (or spousal care in the case of married households) or receive
formal home care.
Some noteworthy observations can be made with regard to living arrangements that involve
care. First, the percentages of individuals who receive informal care in period t and choose to
receive formal home care in t+ 1 and vice versa are relatively low. The percentages are lower
among married than unmarried households and lower among those living independently than
those living with adult children. Second, living arrangements that involve formal home care
seem to be the least stable, often replaced by arrangements with no care. This is particularly
true for married households. These suggest that informal care provided by adult children and
formal home care are not strong substitutes in practice, especially among married households
living independently. They also suggest that, without informal care by adult children or formal
home care by trained professionals, the presence of a spouse allows married households to
switch in and out of a living arrangement more frequently than their unmarried counterparts.
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6.2 Marginal Effects
To interpret the coefficient estimates in Appendix E more easily, I calculate the marginal
effects of the endogenous variables and some policy variables on living arrangements of mar-
ried and unmarried households6 . The marginal effects are based on a model that controls
for unobserved heterogeneity and they are contemporaneous, one-period effects where the en-
dogenous variables are not updated sequentially over time. Shown in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8
for married and unmarried households respectively, the marginal effects are averaged over all
observations in the simulated sample. I draw from the variance-covariance matrix 100 random
sets of coefficients and find the marginal effects for each perturbation, the average of which is
standard error of the marginal effects.
Based on the contemporaneous, one-period marginal effects, I show that the model with
unobserved heterogeneity and one without unobserved heterogeneity differ statistically in Table
G.1 in Appendix G. I perform the t tests and report the test statistics in the table. Some test
statistics are zero because they are rounded to the nearest three decimal places. The non-zero
test statistics are statistically significant at the 5% level. The table suggests that not modeling
unobserved heterogeneity leads to biased estimates.
The marginal effects of good (subjective) health and poor (subjective) health are relative
to excellent health. Good health and poor health affect the probability of living arrangements
in a similar way. As expected, the marginal effects of poor health are stronger than those
of good health (in most cases, twice as strong). Having good or poor health decreases the
probability of living with no care, especially when the individual lives independently. Relative
to excellent subjective health, having good health weakly but significantly induces informal
care, but only in the independent living setting. It leads to an increase of a 0.4 percentage
point and a 0.5 percentage point in the probability of living independently with informal care
for married and unmarried households respectively. Poor health does not have a significant
effect on the provision of informal care. Both good and poor health increase the probability of
6I also calculate the marginal effects of the tax transfer policy but do not report them here since the variable
does not show up significantly in the regressions and does not have statistically significant marginal effects
either.
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receiving formal home care and, in the case of unmarried households, poor health also increases
the likelihood of institutionalization for the elderly.
The marginal effects of moderate disability and severe disability are relative to having no
disability. Moderate and severe disability also affect living arrangements in the same manner.
The signs of the marginal effects are as expected and consistent with those of the subjective
health variables. The marginal effects of severe disability are much stronger than those of
moderate disability except for the arrangements that involve informal care for unmarried
households.
Putting the effects of subjective health and functional health together suggests the follow-
ing. First, living independently with no care and living with adult children with no care are
associated with better subjective health and no disability. Second, the probability of receiving
professionally provided formal home care and nursing home care increases as health deteri-
orates. Finally, the provision of informal care is conditional on the extent to which health
worsens. At least for unmarried households, informal care is more likely to be provided when
the burden of care (proxied by health) on the adult children is not too high.
The marginal effects of savings are based on a 10% increase in the level (as opposed to the
log value) of savings. They pertain not only to the amount of savings, but also the interactions
between savings and the percentages of assets that the elderly would need to lose if they were
to qualify for Medicaid. Savings increase the probability of living independently with no
care and decrease the probability of every other living arrangement, notably intergenerational
coresidence with no care. This suggests that savings matter only insofar as no care is involved.
The marginal effects of the Medicaid-related variables are based on a 10% increase in the
level of the variables. A rise in the ratio of Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS)
spending to nursing home (NH) spending by the Medicaid program at the state level represents
the state’s further commitment to keeping the elderly in the community. The effect of the
increase in the ratio is felt by everyone in the sample, regardless of whether or not they receive
Medicaid benefits. It is weakly but positively correlated with living independently with no
care (leading to an 0.1% point increase). It also has a negative and small effect on receiving
formal home care and seems to decrease institutionalization. I conduct sub-group analyses
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later in the chapter to explain the results. Further investigation into how the state allocates
their budget, with regard to HCBS services, may also be needed.
Expected HCBS and expected NH benefits represent the average amount of state subsidies
that would be given to Medicaid eligibles who receive those respective services, weighted by
the probabilities of receiving those services. Both types of expected benefits rise if 1) the state
allows a higher percentage of Medicaid eligibles to have access to the services or 2) the costs
of the services that would otherwise be paid out of pocket increase. The marginal effects of
both types of expected benefits are similar in sign and significance. They are also very small.
They decrease the probabilities of living independently with no care and intergenerational
coresidence with no care. They also reduce the probability of receiving informal care and
increase the probability if receiving formal home care and nursing home care. The results
are clear evidence of substitution effects, consistent with the fact that Medicaid changes the
relative prices of living arrangement options in favor of formal home care and nursing home
care, dampening down the costs of professional care for its beneficiaries.
Overall, Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 show that living arrangements are statistically significantly
impacted by the endogenous variables. Functional health has the strongest impact and is the
only variable that has a statistically significant marginal effect across all living arrangements.
It is the most predominant predictor of living arrangements. Savings affect living arrangements
but only insofar as no care is involved.
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6.3 Policy Experiments
To evaluate the impacts of policy variables across time, I conduct several simulations in a
dynamic setting. I use the coefficient estimates of the model with unobserved heterogeneity
and update the endogenous variables sequentially over the years to obtain the baseline results.
Then I conduct the following three experiments. First, I increase the ratio of HCBS to nursing
home care spending by 50% and by 100% (or twofold) every year. Second, I increase the
probability of receiving HCBS benefits for Medicaid eligibles by 50% and by 100% every year.
Finally, I increase the probability of receiving nursing home benefits for Medicaid eligibles by
50% and 100% every year. Note that an increase in the probability of receiving HCBS or NH
benefits is equivalent to an increase in the expected benefits of those services. I call them
differently in the policy experiments to be specific in what I increase, avoiding the confusion
that I increase the out of pocket costs of home health services and nursing home care.
I show the marginal effects of the policy experiments in Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 for married
and unmarried households respectively. These marginal effects are long-run marginal effects
that are accumulated for eight years for individuals in the AHEAD and HRS cohorts and six
years for individuals in the CODA and WB cohorts.
In comparison to the one-period marginal effects, the long-run marginal effects mostly have
the same signs and significance. The effects are stronger as expected because I repeatedly
increase the policy variables by a higher percentage (10% versus 50% versus 100%). Even so,
the effects are still small. I concentrate on the twofold increase of the policy variables from
this point on. Note that a twofold increase in the policy variables is not too far reaching as an
experiment, considering that the HCBS to nursing home ratio averages 0.324, the probability
of receiving HCBS benefits 0.014 and the probability of receiving nursing home benefits 0.032
in the sample.
In the analysis that follows, I compare the baseline probability levels with policy simula-
tion results for married and unmarried households. To see how policy changes impact living
arrangements for different groups of people, I categorize the sample based on the jointly made
78
outcomes in the model, namely health, wealth, inter vivos transfers and bequest intent7 . The
results are shown in Table 6.11 - Table 6.20.
One way to read the tables is to think that I draw from the simulated sample different
groups of individuals with certain health, wealth and intergenerational transfer characteristics.
The baseline results are the average probability levels of the living arrangement categories for
individuals who have the same characteristics and the results from the policy experiments
represent what happens to the average probability levels of the same group of individuals
given that exogenous variables shift.
7I also divide the sample into groups based on their education levels and initial annuitization, where I find the
median amount of annuities for each birth cohort in the sample to account for the fact that the elderly enter the
data at different ages and some age groups may have more annuitized wealth than others. The results are not
reported here. The categorization based on education shows roughly the same results as wealth, as expected.
The categorization based on initial annuitization reveals that, regardless of their marital status, individuals
with more than the median amount of annuities have a higher probability of living with adult children with no
care and a lower probability of living independently with no care and living independently with formal home
care.
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6.3.1 Effects of Policy Experiments Based on Initial Health
First, I group the simulated sample based on their initial subjective and functional health
(i.e., the subjective and functional health states that they enter the sample with). I show the
comparison between baseline probability levels and those from the policy experiments based
on the sample’s initial subjective health in Table 6.11 - Table 6.12 and based on the sample’s
initial functional health in Table 6.13 - Table 6.14.
The same pattern emerges between subjective health and functional health. As health
worsens, the elderly are less likely to live independently with no care, more likely to receive
informal care and formal home care and more likely to be institutionalized. In the case of
unmarried households, less healthy elders are also less likely to live with adult children with
no care but for married households, they are more likely to live with adult children with no
care only when health does not worsen to the extent that care needs to be put in place.
Among married households, an increase in the ratio of HCBS to nursing home spending
has similar impacts across all health groups. It increases living independently with no care,
decreases intergenerational coresidence with no care, the receipt of formal home care and in-
stitutionalization. An increase in the probability of receiving HCBS benefits has a pronounced
impact only among those with poor subjective health or severe disability but not among other
health groups. An increase in the probability of receiving nursing home benefits, however,
has an impact on most health groups except those with excellent subjective health. It wit-
nesses the elders substituting away from independent living with no care toward formal home
care and nursing home arrangements. In the case of households with severe disability, there
is an approximately eight percentage point difference in the categories of intergenerational
coresidence with formal home care and nursing home.
Among unmarried households, the effects of policy changes are not the same across health
groups. The twofold increase in the spending ratio increases the probability of living inde-
pendently with no care but decreases the probability levels of all other living arrangements
for individuals with no disability and excellent health. For the other health groups, the pol-
icy change decreases living independently with informal care but increases intergenerational
82
coresidence with informal care. It decreases the probability of living independently with formal
home care and nursing home care. The main distinction lies with living independently with
formal home care whose probability increases in the poor subjective health and severe dis-
ability groups. The effects of the increase in the probabilities of receiving HCBS benefits and
nursing home benefits for unmarried households are similar to those of married households.
The results unveil that different health groups benefit from Medicaid differently and that
the care arrangements for married and unmarried households are different. Those coming
into the sample with poorer health benefit more from the policy changes, moving towards
arrangements that become relatively cheaper. The policy changes have less pronounced effects
on those with better initial health. With regard to the increase in the HCBS to nursing home
spending ratio, married households tend to move towards living independently with no care
only while unmarried households with poor initial health either choose to live independently
with no care or live with adult children with informal care.
The fact that the probability of formal home care does not increase across all households
when the HCBS spending increases seems surprising at first. However, so long as the increase
in the ratio of HCBS to nursing home spending decreases institutionalization, the results are
not inconsistent with the services provided by HCBS. Those services include medical services,
such as skilled nursing services and subsidies to informal care providers (excluding spouses),
as well as non-medical services, such as respite, environmental modifications (which refer to
physical adaptations to the home), assistive technology, transportation and meal services. In
light of the above results, it is possible that an increase in HCBS spending allows the elderly
parents, particularly those with a spouse, to live independently more easily and become less
reliant on care by adult children and professionals. It is also possible that since the only source
of informal care for unmarried households is adult children, unmarried elders choose informal
care at the expense of formal home care, so their children can be paid by the state (although
not every state provides subsidies for informal care providers).
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6.3.2 Effects of Policy Experiments Based on Initial Wealth
Table 6.15 - Table 6.16 show the comparison between baseline results and policy experi-
ments based on the sample’s initial wealth (i.e., wealth that the elderly enter the sample with).
I divide the married and the unmarried samples into four initial wealth quartiles.
A 100% increase in the HCBS to nursing home spending ratio has some effects across
all initial wealth groups. Regardless of the household’s initial wealth and marital status,
the policy change increases the probability of living independently with no care by roughly
one percentage point. In the case of married households, it also decreases intergenerational
coresidence with no care by roughly one percentage point across all wealth quartiles. Living
arrangements with formal home care have lower probabilities in general. Unmarried households
with lower than median initial wealth, where the twofold increase in the spending ratio increases
intergenerational coresidence with informal care. This is consistent with the earlier results by
health groups, especially if people with low wealth also have poor health. The policy change has
the expected effects on nursing home use. It decreases the probability of institutionalization
by an average of 0.3 percentage point for unmarried households.
The effects of the change in the probabilities of receiving HCBS benefits and nursing
home benefits are as expected. They are pronounced only among households with low initial
wealth (the first quartile for married households and lower than median wealth for unmarried
households). These individuals are more likely to be eligible for Medicaid, which is a means-
tested program.
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6.3.3 Effects of Policy Experiments Based on Intergenerational Transfers
I divide the sample into groups based on the simulated outcomes of intergenerational
transfers in each period. If the elderly are simulated to not make an inter vivos transfer in
period t, I put them in the no transfer group in period t. If the elderly are simulated to make
an inter vivos transfer in period t, I categorize them based on whether they make more than
the median amount of inter vivos transfers in period t. I repeat the process for every period.
Also, since bequest intent represents a promise of future transfers, I group individuals based
on their simulated outcomes of bequest intent in every period. The comparisons between the
baseline results and policy experiments for groups of inter vivos transfers are shown in Table
6.17 - Table 6.18 and for groups of bequest intent in Table 6.19 - Table 6.20.
The results show no clear patterns and the results by inter vivos transfers and by bequest
intent are not always consistent. For example, at the baseline, the probability of living inde-
pendently with informal care decreases as the amount of inter vivos transfers increases, but it
increases as the household intends bequests.
What the results do suggest is that the exchange hypothesis, which argues that informal
care can be manipulated by intergenerational transfers, does not seem to hold in the living
arrangement outcomes. If it did hold, one would expect to see an increase in the probability
of informal care arrangements (or at least intergenerational coresidence) as the amount of
inter vivos transfers increases and as the household promises bequests in the future. However,
considering the amount of inter vivos transfers that an adult child receives on average (a small
2780 USD for two years), it is understandable that the impact of intergenerational transfers on
living arrangements is not detectable at the household level. It would seem that adult children
provide informal care not because they receive compensation from the parents but for reasons
that are beyond the scope of this dissertation (possibly altruistically motivated).
My results on the impact of intergenerational transfers are not sensitive to the assump-
tion on the timing in which intergenerational transfers influence living arrangement outcomes
through the provision of informal care. In this research, I follow the literature in making the
assumption that intergenerational transfers impact informal care only contemporaneously. No
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lagged intergenerational transfers enter the model specifications. In an alternative empirical
model that I estimate, I explore a different assumption. I include lagged inter vivos transfer
amount and lagged bequest intent in the per-period equations, essentially allowing past inter-
generational transfers to have a direct impact on living arrangements. The regression results
are as follows. For married households, lagged inter vivos transfer amount and lagged bequest
intent seem to induce informal care in the independent living setting but not when the parent
lives with her children. They significantly predict intergenerational coresidence with no care,
relative to living independently with no care but do not have the same sign. For unmarried
households, lagged intergenerational transfers statistically significantly increase the use of for-
mal home care but have no impact on the receipt of informal care. The results of the alternative
model with and without unobserved heterogeneity are available upon request. They reinforce
the earlier conclusion that intergenerational transfers do not enter living arrangements through
the channel suggested by the exchange hypothesis.
The above sections show that living arrangements are affected by health, particularly func-
tional health, and wealth and they can be manipulated by public policies, although the effects
are small. Also, while affecting the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (since the unob-
served heterogeneity parameters for these equations are significant according to Table E.8),
inter vivos transfers and bequest intent do not seem to have an impact on living arrangements.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this dissertation, I uncover the dynamics of living arrangements among the elderly,
separating households by their marital status and identifying important predictors of living
arrangements. I assess the impact of intergenerational transfers on living arrangements and
quantify the extent to which public policies, particularly Medicaid, affect living arrangements.
I use the nonlinear discrete factor random effects estimation method and jointly estimate
outcomes of living arrangements, savings, inter vivos transfers, bequest intent, subjective
health, functional health and actual bequests. I account for unobserved heterogeneity that
is correlated across equations and across time. I use the data from the 1995-2006 waves of
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and supplement them with data on public policies,
particularly Medicaid, and costs of care.
The results suggest that, among the joint decisions that the elderly make, living arrange-
ments are strongly influenced by subjective and functional health and by savings. The most
predominant predictor of living arrangements is functional health. Elderly individuals with
better health and more bequeathable wealth are more likely to live independently with no care.
When health deteriorates, some care is put in place. The main difference between informal
care, on one hand, and formal home care and nursing home care, on the other, is that the
former is likely provided only when the burden on the adult children is relatively low. That
is, at least for unmarried households, informal care is more likely when the elderly have mod-
erate disability relative to no disability and relative to severe disability and when the elderly
have good health relative to excellent health and relative to poor health. Savings significantly
affect living arrangements but only as far as no care is involved. When care is required, health
dominates.
Inter vivos transfers and bequest intent impact living arrangements only to the extent
that they affect the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, evidenced by the statistical sig-
nificance of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters in these equations. The unobserved
heterogeneity parameters for the intergenerational transfer equations also have the same signs
across the mass points, implying that individuals who make intergenerational transfers and
those who do not are of different types. However, the directions in which intergenerational
transfers impact the behavior of different ‘types’ of individuals such that they ultimately in-
fluence living arrangements are unclear. Nevertheless, the results offer no support for the
exchange theory as far as living arrangements are concerned.
It should be noted that the lack of evidence for the exchange theory is not proof against
its validity. To test if the hypothesis is valid is better done at the child level, where the
behavior of each child in the same household is observed. In this research, I consider only
the average characteristics and the average behavior of children in the family and do not
distinguish between adult children who receive intergenerational transfers and those who do
not, nor do I consider if intergenerational transfers motivate the recipient to provide informal
care.
Public policies have a role in the determination of living arrangements. Transfer tax policies
do not have a significant effect on living arrangements. I focus on Medicaid. In particular, I
study the impact of an increase in the ratio of home- and community-based services (HCBS) to
nursing home spending, an increase in the expected benefits of HCBS among Medicaid eligibles
and an increase in the expected benefits of nursing home care among Medicaid eligibles. The
expected benefits refer to the probability of receiving such services multiplied by the costs of
such services that would otherwise be paid out of pocket, so I use the term interchangeably
with the probability of receiving HCBS or of receiving nursing home benefits.
The policy changes have small but significant effects on living arrangements. A twofold
increase in the ratio of HCBS to nursing home spending is associated with an increase of
about one percentage point in the probability of living independently with no care and a
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small decrease in the use of formal home care (by about a 0.1 percentage point for married
households and a 0.6 percentage point for unmarried households). In the case of married
households, the policy change is also associated with a decrease of about one percentage point
in the probability of intergenerational coresidence with no care. A decrease in the probability
of any living arrangement seems to be fully absorbed by the increase in the probability of living
independently with no care. In the case of unmarried households, with poor subjective and
functional health and lower than median wealth entering the sample, the policy change shows
a decrease in the use of formal home care, an increase in the probability of living independently
with no care and an increase in the probability of living in an intergenerational household with
informal care. There is also a small decrease in the use of nursing home care among unmarried
households with poor initial health and poor initial wealth too.
Note that so long as the increase in the ratio of HCBS to nursing home spending decreases
institutionalization, the results are not inconsistent with the services provided by HCBS. Along
with home-based nursing services, HCBS also includes services that are amenable to living
independently such as environmental modifications, transportation and meal services and to
receiving informal care such as subsidies to informal care providers (excluding spouses) and
respite. However, the results beg the questions of 1) the extent to which HCBS services are
widespread and accessible to people on Medicaid, 2) the target population of HCBS services in
each state, 3) the area of care or services that the spending on HCBS services goes to and 4)
the ease at which informal caregivers (adult children) can become eligible for subsidies. These
pieces of information are largely missing in the literature (Muramatsu et al., 2007). With an
increase in the government’s commitment to keeping the elderly in the community, research
in these directions could shed some light on, for example, whether or not the elderly replace
formal home care with non-medical services that make living independently easier or with
informal care. We may also need to evaluate the effectiveness of the HCBS services in keeping
the elderly in the community.
An increase in the probabilities of receiving HCBS services and NH services shows clear
substitution effects. Medicaid eligibles who have better access to those services at a low
cost subsitute away from the living arrangements with no care and informal care towards
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the arrangements with formal home care and nursing home care. The effects are small (less
than 0.1% for the entire sample). However, they are much more pronounced among those
with poor initial health and low initial wealth, as these individuals are more likely to receive
Medicaid benefits. For example, a twofold increase in the probability of receiving nursing home
benefits among Medicaid eligibles is associated with an increase of a 7.5 percentage point in
the probability of living in a nursing home among married individuals with severe disability.
Overall, the policy experiments suggest public policies have behavioral effects on elderly
individuals in that they induce changes towards living arrangements that are most beneficial to
the elderly. There is also evidence of crowding out of private efforts; informal care is replaced
by formal home care and nursing home care when the probabilities of receiving Medicaid
benefits among Medicaid eligibles increase.
In light of the above results, in addition to gathering more data on public policies, future
research should take into account the fact that health is the most predominant factor of living
arrangements. Models that involve more complex interactions of health with intergenerational
transfers and/or Medicaid could give a more detailed insight into how the elderly switch into
and out of a living arrangement.
An assessment of different services offered by the Medicaid program will also be useful.
That a 100% increase in various Medicaid benefits yields small changes in living arrangements
makes obvious the fact that the government needs to increase spending on Medicaid services
on a regular basis, if they wish to keep people in the community. What is less obvious is
which Medicaid services being offered provide the best results. For example, it is possible that
respite counteracts the crowding out effects of Medicaid and states that provide such service
experience a higher success rate than states that do not.
Another direction in which future research could go into is whether Medicaid has spillover
effects. The externalities could be on family caregiving resources or the use of professionally
provided care by the elderly, given their Medicaid status. The effects will likely be different
among individuals who are fully covered by Medicaid, those who are only partially covered by
Medicaid and those who do not benefit directly from Medicaid. Considering that there are
services that overlap between Medicaid and other public programs, such as temporary hospice
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and home health services by Medicare Part A or care subsidies by the Older Americans Act, it is
likely that an increase in Medicaid spending in one publicly provided service has unanticipated
benefits in other services and to individuals not covered by the program.
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Appendix A
Medicaid for the Elderly
One way in which the Medicaid health care program can be understood is to consider it in
conjunction with Medicare. Enacted in 1965, the Medicare health care program covers almost
all of the United States’ elderly, defined as 65 years of age or older. The program is provided by
the federal government. Medicare covers and guarantees hospital care and physician services.
The program’s coverage does not vary by state of residence and Medicare beneficiaries can
choose their medical care providers (Rowland and Lyons, 1996). However, Medicare does not
cover a number of medical services deemed necessary for the elderly and it is not free.
Medicare coverage can be categorized into Medicare Part A, Part B, Part C and Part
D. Medicare Part A is also called the “Original Medicare Plan”, provided by the federal
government. Medicare beneficiaries upon being eligible can choose to add Part B and Part
D. The combination of Medicare Part A and Part B constitutes Medicare Part C otherwise
known as a “Medicare Advantage Plan” and it is provided by a private insurance company
that is approved by the federal government. Part D is a stand-alone prescription drug coverage
insurance that is provided by private insurance companies. I discuss Medicare Part A and Part
B (thereby indirectly referring to Part C) to illustrate the fact that Medicare is not all-inclusive
and not free.
Medicare Part A provides coverage of short-term hospital care, hospice and inpatient care
at a skilled nursing facility as well as home health services. Medicare Part B covers outpatient
care, physician and ambulatory services as well as home health care visits. Among a list of
medical services not covered by Medicare are outpatient prescription drugs, vision care, long
term care and nursing home care.
Medicare beneficiaries pay a deductible for Medicare Part A. They pay a premium, a
deductible and some percentage of coinsurance (typically 20%) for Medicare Part B. The
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nation’s out of pocket spending on premiums and deductibles for Medicare Part A and Part
B alone averaged at 913 USD for the poor elderly in 1994, accounting for roughly one-third of
their wealth (Rowland and Lyons, 1996).
The Medicaid health care program fills the gap for poor elderly Medicare beneficiaries;
around six million Medicare beneficiaries (roughly 12%) in 1999 were also Medicaid-eligible
(Schneider et al., 1999). Its coverage includes (1) medical services not covered by Medicare,
most notably long term care and outpatient prescription drugs and (2) payment of the costs
of Medicare (Part B) premiums and coinsurance. Unlike federally-managed Medicare, Medi-
caid is funded and administered by both the federal and the state governments. The federal
government provides guidelines on Medicaid eligibility rules, benefits and payment rates but
the state governments are given flexibility in implementing these guidelines.
States determine the list of medical services included in the Medicaid coverage. Federal law
requires that the following services be included as part of Medicaid coverage: inpatient and
outpatient hospital services, physician services, lab and x-ray, services provided by federally-
qualified health centers (FQHCs) and rural health clinics (RHCs), home health care, nursing
home and transportation for medical services. They can opt (but are not required by the
federal law) to cover prescription drugs, physical therapy services, dental services and home and
community-based care services for persons with impairments (also known as section 1915(c)
waivers or HCBS waivers). Particularly relevant to this paper is the provision of nursing home,
home health care and HCBS.
Some states also exercise program waivers, determining the care delivery systems for Med-
icaid beneficiaries. The most common program waiver is under Section 1915 (b) which allows
states to implement a managed care system, thereby limiting Medicaid recipients to a spe-
cific set of care providers. Managed care often entails enrollment with health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), managed care organizations (MCOs) and Primary Care Case Manage-
ment (PCCM) system. Medicaid beneficiaries needing care are to seek providers within these
networks only.
Medicaid eligibility rules are complicated. They differ from one state to another and the
extent of coverage received by each Medicaid beneficiary varies depending on the pathway in
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which they become eligible. Some Medicaid beneficiaries are entitled to full Medicaid coverage,
receiving medical services not covered by Medicare at little or no cost, while others are entitled
to partial Medicaid coverage. Partial Medicaid coverage refers to assistance with Medicare
Part B premium and coinsurance requirements and excludes medical services outside of the
Medicare coverage that would otherwise be paid for under full Medicaid coverage (e.g., long
term care and nursing home stay).
Regardless of the extent of coverage received, federal law requires that an individual meet
non-financial and financial requirements in order to qualify for Medicaid. The non-financial
requirements include 1) being in a qualifying category (e.g., being of a certain age or having
disabilities); 2) being an U.S. citizen or legal immigrants (–please refer to the 1996 Welfare law
for more details) and 3) being a resident of the state whose Medicaid coverage the individual is
applying for. The financial requirements include meeting the income and the asset (‘resource’)
criteria. Income and asset eligibility rules refer to the standard (the amount of income or
assets the individual possesses) and the methodology (the way in which income and assets
are counted for the purpose of Medicaid eligibility). Income and asset eligibility rules are
state-specific and they are different for different Medicaid eligibility pathways.
Depending on their state of residency, there is more than one pathway in which an elderly
individual can become entitled to full Medicaid coverage. The first pathway, mandatory ac-
cording to the federal law, is through the ‘categorically needy’ program. Individuals qualify
for Medicaid if they are eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or have an income less
than 74% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). In some states, persons are eligible for Medicaid
through receiving state assistance according to the 209(b) option in the 1972 Social Security
Act Amendments. The 209(b) states implement more restrictive income and resource require-
ments than SSI and allow individuals to spend down their incomes but not their resources for
Medicaid eligibility unlike states with the SSI pathway which do not allow spending down at
all.
The SSI states vary in terms of what counts as countable income and what counts as
countable resources when determining SSI eligibility. However, typically Social Security does
not count the following sources of income and resources: -
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1) the first 20 USD a month of most incomes;
2) the first 65 USD a month of earned incomes and half the amount over 65 USD;
3) food stamps;
4) shelter received from non-profit organizations;
5) most home energy assistance;
6) part of the spouse’s income and resources;
7) the home the SSI applicant lives in and the land it is on;
8) life insurance policies with a face value of $1500 or less;
9) the applicant’s car (usually);
10) burial plots for the applicant and her immediate family members; and
11) up to 1500 USD in burial funds for the applicant and/or her spouse.
Full Medicaid coverage is possible through other pathways at state option. One of the
optional pathways is for elderly persons who receive State Supplementation Payments (SSP)
but not SSI payments. In 1998, all but seven states provided some amount of SSP payment
for the elderly poor but only 28 states made available Medicaid coverage to SSP recipients.
Another pathway is when the Medicaid benefits are extended to elderly persons with in-
comes up to 100% of the FPL. Many elderly persons who receive SSI also receive Social Security
benefits and Social Security benefits increase with the costs of living. When the costs of living
are higher, Social Security benefits increase and may tip the amount of income the individual
has over the SSI threshold. However, these individuals would still qualify for Medicaid under
the so-called ‘Pickle Amendment’.
Another pathway to become eligible for full Medicaid coverage is through elderly individuals
being ‘medically needy’. Individuals are allowed to spend down their incomes (but not their
resources) to qualify for Medicaid by deducting incurred medical expenses from their excess
income. In 1998, 35 states had a Medically Needy program.
The final pathway is when states increase the income limit for already institutionalized
individuals with too much income to qualify for Medicaid through the categorically needy
channel but not enough to cover the costs of nursing home. The increased limit can be as high
as 300% of the SSI standard. Eligible individuals are required to spend all of their incomes
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on the costs of nursing home except for a small personal needs allowance. The special income
rule has an upper income threshold but the medically needy program does not. In 1998, 33
states had the 300% rule in effect.
States under the section 1915(c) waiver authority can choose to provide home and community-
based services (HCBS) for elderly individuals at risk of institutionalization, in addition to
nursing home and home health care. The HCBS waiver essentially provides subsidies to the
use of formal home care and informal care providers to encourage keeping the elderly in the
community and to reduce the costs of nursing home care paid for by the state governments.
The HCBS waiver is offered to specific populations and its eligibility rules again vary depend-
ing on the state of residency. Some states use the 300% rule while others employ the ‘medically
needy’ spend-down rules (Bruen et al., 1999).
Complication in establishing eligibility for an individual arises when he/she is married, re-
ceives Medicaid benefits while the spouse does not, yet the couple shares income and resources.
A special set of income and resource methodologies, known as the spousal impoverishment
methodologies, applies to married couples separated by the institutionalization of one spouse.
The same methodologies may or may not apply to couples separated by the HCBS waiver.
The purpose of spousal impoverishment rules is to accommodate the institutionalized spouse
to receive Medicaid benefits while allowing the community spouse to retain sufficient wealth.
The spousal impoverishment rules are different for income and assets. With respect to
income, when one member of the married couple applies for Medicaid, the income of the couple
is divided to each member according to individual ownership. Shared income is split equally.
Income of the community spouse is protected after Medicaid eligibility has been established
for the institutionalized spouse, subject to a maximum and minimum income standard. For
example, in 1999, the minimum amount of income the community spouse was allowed to keep
was 1382.50 USD per month and the maximum was 2049 USD per month. With regard to
assets, the countable resources are calculated and the community spouse is allowed to keep half
of the resources, again subject to a maximum and a minimum amount. The institutionalized
spouse must spend down the remaining resources to the SSI level before qualifying for Medicaid.
Federal law requires that states provide partial Medicaid coverage to a number of Medicare
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beneficiaries who are not poor enough to qualify for full Medicaid coverage yet are poor enough
to be in need of assistance for Medicare premiums and coinsurance. Individuals eligible for
partial Medicaid coverage can be grouped into the following categories.
1. Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs) are persons with income up to 100% of
the FPL. Medicaid pays the Medicare Part A and B premiums, deductibles and cost sharing
related to Medicare covered benefits.
2. Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries (SLIMBs) are those with incomes be-
tween 100% and 120% of the FPL. Medicaid pays the Medicare Part B premium.
3. Qualified Individuals (QIs) are those whose incomes are between 120% and 135% or
up to 175% of the FPL depending on their state of residency. Medicaid pays the Medicare
Part B premium.
4. Qualified Disabled and Working Individuals (QDWIs) are persons with incomes be-
tween 100% and 200% of the FPL or disabled persons who lost their Medicare Part A benefits
because their earnings had increased. Medicaid pays Medicare Part A deductibles.
Despite a broad range of pathways in which an elderly person may qualify for Medicaid,
relatively recent developments have made it more difficult for eligible individuals to take ad-
vantage of Medicaid benefits. The supply restrictions imposed by some states include the
Certificate of Need (CON) or construction moratorium restrictions and the Medicaid reim-
bursement rate that is lower than the private-pay and Medicare rates. The CON restriction
regulates growth of nursing home beds and the conversion of hospital beds into nursing home
beds. The low reimbursement rate may induce nursing homes to accept higher-paying residents
and then fill up the remaining beds with Medicaid beneficiaries (Grabowski, 2001).
In light of the analysis of living arrangements chosen by the elderly, state variations in
Medicaid eligibility rules, benefits and supply restrictions will have to be taken into account.
While the original Medicaid plan clearly reduces the costs of institutionalization for eligible
individuals and makes nursing home a more attractive living mode for the elderly, the in-
troduction of HCBS gives the elderly an added incentive to live independently or with their
children, especially when the nursing home bed restrictions are in place.
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Table A.1: Medicaid Eligibility by Marital Status and Living Arrangement: 1998∗
States Income Limits: Income Limits: Asset Limits:
Community Living Nursing Home Community Living
Singles Couples Residents Singles Couples
AL 494 741 1482 2000 3000
AK 856 1269 1482 2000 3000
AZ 494 741 1482 2000 3000
CA 650 1156 650 2000 3000
CO 533 1086 1482 2000 3000
CTa 747 1094 1482 1600 2400
DC 494 741 512 2000 3000
FL 494 741 1482 2000 3000
ID 542 758 1482 2000 3000
ILa 283 375 283 2000 3000
INa 494 741 494 1500 2250
IA 516 763 1482 2000 3000
KS 494 741 494 2000 3000
ME 504 756 1482 2000 3000
MA 623 943 623 2000 3000
MI 508 769 1482 2000 2000
MNa 575 852 575 3000 6000
MOa 494 741 494 999.99 2000
NE 502 839 502 2000 3000
NV 530 815 1482 2000 3000
NHa 521 762 1482 1500 1500
NJ 525 766 1482 2000 3000
NY 580 844 580 2000 3000
NC 494 741 494 2000 3000
NDa 494 741 494 3000 6000
OHa 427 741 1482 1500 2250
OKa 547 847 1482 2000 3000
OR 496 741 1482 2000 3000
PA 521 785 1482 2000 3000
RI 558 862 1482 2000 3000
SD 509 756 1482 2000 3000
TX 494 741 1482 2000 3000
VT 549 844 549 2000 3000
VAa 494 741 1482 2000 3000
WA 521 762 1482 2000 3000
WI 578 873 578 2000 3000
WY 494 741 1482 2000 3000
Sources: Schneider et al. (1999); Bruen et al. (1999); Gardner and Gilleskie (2009)
Notes: (1) The figures refer to the maximum limits for the categorically needy pathway.(2) a represents
209(b) states.
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Appendix B
Estate and Gift Tax
Appendix B discusses the transfer tax system. The umbrella term ‘transfer tax’ nests
three types of tax that interact in a complex manner. First, gift tax is applied to a transfer of
property for less than its full value, direct gifts such as cash, stocks, bonds, businesses or real
estate, and indirect gifts such as a cancellation of debt or loaning 10,000 USD or more at less
than the market interest rate. It applies to transfers to related or unrelated persons but does
not apply to inter-spousal transfers. Gift tax that applies to related persons who are more
than one generation younger than the donor is known as ‘generation-skipping transfer tax’
(GST). The nature of the GST tax is largely similar to the regular gift tax and therefore will
not be discussed in detail. The gift tax is computed annually and gifts are liable to tax only
when their values are above the annual exclusion amount. The difference between the total
value of gifts given to a recipient in one year and the annual exclusion amount is cumulated
over lifetime. Second, the estate tax applies to taxable estate upon death of the donor as
well as the cumulated taxable gifts. Finally, capital gains tax, which is part of the income tax,
applies to a transfer of an investment with unrealized capital gains. The basis on which capital
gains tax is computed depends on whether the investment is given to the recipient as a gift
or a bequest. The donor is usually responsible for the gift tax (although an agreement could
be made otherwise) while the recipient is responsible for the estate and the capital gains tax.
Table B.1 shows a brief historical evolution of transfer tax incentives and gives an insight into
how the transfer tax system is shaped to its current form today. More details can be found in
Luckey (2003).
Donors can exploit different avenues of tax avoidance in order to maximize the amount of
wealth passed on to their children. The first feature of the gift tax that allows wealth to be
transferred tax-free is the provision of annual exclusion amount and lifetime exclusion amount
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Table B.1: Brief Overview of Historical Evolution of Transfer Tax Laws
Legislations Contributions to the System
Tax Reform Act 1976 Unification of estate and gift taxes.
(effective 1997) Introduction of GSTT, applied to direct transfers to grandchildren.
Gifts made within 3 years of death included in estate tax.
ERTA 1981 Unlimited marital deduction/ inter-spousal transfers.
(effective 1982) Tuition payment and medical expenses exempted from gift tax.
Gift taxes made within 3 years of death included in estate tax.
Tax Reform Act 1984 Below-market rate loans considered taxable gifts.
(effective 1985)
Tax Reform Act 1986 GSTT extended to apply to trust provided for grandchildren.
(effective 1986)
Tax Relief Act 1997 Expansion of tax exclusion amounts, making it inflation-indexed.
(effective 1998)
EGTRRA 2001 Temporary changes to transfer tax rates made, effective until 2010.
(effective 2002)
Sources: Luckey (2003); Joulfaian (2007)
Notes: EGRTA = Economic Recovery Tax Act; EGTRRA = Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon-
ciliation Act
(or lifetime taxable gift limit). The annual exclusion amount determines the value of transfers
that a donor can make tax-free in a particular year. The amount is per recipient and currently
inflation-indexed using CPI-U for the year before the transfer. The lifetime exclusion amount
determines the value of transfers that a donor can make tax-free in addition to the annual
exclusion amount. The amount is per donor and should be thought of as a lifetime credit of
gift tax allowance. Under the gift-splitting principle where married couples are treated as two
individuals making gifts separately, the exclusion amounts (lifetime and annual) double for the
household. Gifts are liable to the gift tax only when their total value for one recipient exceeds
the annual exclusion amount. The donor may or may not have to pay the gift tax in that year,
depending on whether she has used up her lifetime exclusion amount. Table B.2 shows the
annual and lifetime exclusion amounts for the years 1992-2006.
The second feature of the gift tax that can be exploited to increase wealth transmitted
to children is the fact that it operates on a tax exclusive basis. The gift tax is calculated
based on the amount received by the recipient and not the total amount (including tax) given
by the donor. The basis of the gift tax is therefore the post-tax value of transfer. This is in
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Table B.2: Transfer Tax Exclusion Amounts 1992-2006
Year Lifetime Exclusion* Annual Exclusion*
1992 600,000 10,000
1993 600,000 10,000
1994 600,000 10,000
1995 600,000 10,000
1996 600,000 10,000
1998 625,000 10,000
2000 675,000 10,000
2002 1,000,000 11,000
2004 1,500,000 11,000
2006 2,000,000 12,000
Sources: IRS online publication 950; ”History, Present Law, and Analysis of the Federal Wealth Transfer
Tax System” (Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 2007); Jacobson et al. (2007); Joulfaian
(2007).
Notes: * denotes exclusion amount for single households. The amount doubles for married households.
stark contrast with the estate tax where the total amount relinquished by the donor is taxable,
known as the tax inclusive basis. The implication is that, given that the gift and estate taxes
have been unified, the effective rate of tax on gifts is typically lower than that on bequests or
the statutory tax rate (as shown in Table B.3). It should also be noted that gifts surrendered
within three years of the date of the donor’s death are considered part of the estate tax. In
other words, transfers that are made closer to the date of the donor’s death lose their tax
exclusive advantage.
The timing of the transfer of an investment matters. Under the current tax system, a
transferred asset with unrealized capital gains is liable to the capital gains tax, which is
computed based on the sale value of the asset minus the asset’s basis (or costs of the seller).
The basis is different if the asset is transferred as a gift than if it is part of the recipient’s
bequest. As a gift, the basis is known as carryover or that the basis of the donor is carried
over to the recipient, with adjustments for the appreciation of the asset and a share of taxes
already paid prior to the transfer. As part of the bequest, the asset is subject to what is known
as the stepped up basis or the fair market value of the asset at the date of the donor’s death
(Luckey, 2003). If an investment has large unrealized capital gains, the stepped up basis will
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Table B.3: Gift Tax Rate Schedule 1992-2006
Taxable gift/estate Tax Rates
(USD) 1992-2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
0-10000 18 18 18 18 18 18
10-20000 20 20 20 20 20 20
20-40000 22 22 22 22 22 22
40-60000 24 24 24 24 24 24
60-80000 26 26 26 26 26 26
80-100000 28 28 28 28 28 28
100-150000 30 30 30 30 30 30
150-250000 32 32 32 32 32 32
250-500000 34 34 34 34 34 34
500-750000 37 37 37 37 37 37
750-1000000 39 39 39 39 39 39
1000-1250000 41 41 41 41 41 41
1250-1500000 43 43 43 43 43 43
1500-2000000 45 45 45 45 45 45
2000-2500000 49 49 49 48 47 46
2500-3000000 53 50 49 48 47 46
More than 3000000 55 50 49 48 47 46
Sources: Joulfaian (2007)
be greater than the carryover basis and the transfer of the investment is liable to less tax if it
constitutes part of the bequest.
Elderly parents who understand the interactions among gift, estate and capital gains taxes
can maximize the amount of wealth transferred to their children. It is clear that transfer-
maximizing parents should give gifts equal to the value of the annual exclusion amount to
each of their children every year. If the parents know their date of death with certainty, they
should deplete the lifetime taxable limit 3 years before their death to take advantage of the
tax exclusive basis. They should also leave an investment with large unrealized gains as part
of the bequest because the asset’s basis will be larger than if the investment is given as a gift.
Careful estate planning should entail making gifts at an increasing rate as the elderly grow
older. The literature review discusses evidence of whether the elderly fully exploit the transfer
tax system.
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Appendix C
Comparison Between Retained and
Discarded Data
Table C.1: Comparison Between Samples: Dependent Variables
Variables Retained Data Discarded Data
Living arrangement (LAt)
- % nursing home (j = 6) 2.51 2.61
- % coresident, formal home care (j = 5) 1.99 2.35
- % coresident, informal care (j = 4) 3.04 3.12
- % coresident, no care (j = 3) 16.58 30.30
- % independent, formal home care (j = 2) 5.73 4.67
- % independent, informal care (j = 1) 3.43 2.45
- % independent, no care (j = 0) 66.73 54.49
Savings∗10−4(At) 31.319 30.061
(123.03) (151.07)
Any inter vivos transfer (IVt) 0.331 0.231
(0.471) (0.421)
Amount of IV transfers/ child∗10−4(IV At) 0.278 0.313
(conditional on any) (1.088) (1.504)
Bequest intent (Bt) 0.486 0.315
(0.499) (0.465)
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Table C.1 (Continued)
Variables Retained Data Discarded Data
Subjective health (Ht+1)
- % excellent/very good (h = 3) 36.41 38.14
- % good/fair (h = 2) 49.33 43.29
- % poor (h = 1) 8.86 8.75
- % deceased (h = 0) 6.88 9.82
Functional health (Dt+1)
- % no disabilty (d = 2) 75.87 76.66
- % moderate disability (d = 1) 17.46 13.56
- % severe disability (d = 0) 6.67 9.78
Leave bequest (Bt+1|Ht+1 = 0) 0.111 0.239
(conditional on being deceased) (0.314) (0.427)
Value of bequests/ child∗10−4(BAt+1|Ht+1 = 0) 0.867 0.776
(conditional on any & deceased) (4.329) (5.936)
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Table C.2: Comparison Between Samples: Dependent Variables by Marital Status
Variables Retained Data Discarded Data
Married Unmarried Married Unmarried
Living arrangement
- % nursing home 0.94 5.80 1.82 3.75
- % coresident, formal home care 1.13 3.77 1.87 3.05
- % coresident, informal care 1.94 5.33 2.70 3.73
- % coresident, no care 16.19 17.40 33.61 25.52
- % independent, formal home care 4.61 8.08 4.17 5.40
- % independent, informal care 2.54 5.29 1.99 3.12
- % independent, no care 72.66 54.33 53.83 55.43
Savings∗10−4 38.981 15.286 40.818 19.208
(139.09) (77.084) (190.76) (94.346)
Any inter vivos transfer 0.369 0.253 0.288 0.177
(0.482) (0.435) (0.453) (0.381)
Amount of IV transfers/ child∗10−4 0.262 0.325 0.275 0.381
(conditional on any) (0.833) (1.635) (1.212) (1.731)
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Table C.3: Comparison Between Samples: Independent Variables
Variables Included Discarded T-Statistics
Personal Characteristics
Annuitized Income∗10−4 3.285 3.348 0.014
(2-year period) (4.566) (3.941)
Age 68.101 63.668 0.401
(10.431) (13.152)
Female 0.595 0.562 0.067
(0.491) (0.496)
Nonwhite 0.158 0.233 0.199
(0.364) (0.423)
Born outside US 0.086 0.126 0.138
(0.279) (0.331)
Married 0.685 0.592 0.197
(0.464) (0.499)
Divorced 0.075 0.196 0.407
(0.264) (0.397)
Widowed 0.227 0.157 0.172
(0.418) (0.364)
Single 0.013 0.023 0.143
(0.013) (0.149)
Number of adult children 5.825 5.829 0.415
(3.440) (4.993)
Education (years) 12.022 12.336 0.093
(3.304) (3.583)
On Medicaid 0.085 0.115 0.104
(0.279) (0.319)
Spousal Characteristics
Spouse info missing, if married 0.009 0.049 0.309
(0.092) (0.217)
Spouse age 65.943 60.576 0.548
(9.637) (11.506)
Spouse nonwhite 0.088 0.074 0.050
(0.283) (0.261)
Spouse education (years) 12.370 12.845 0.153
(3.086) (3.363)
Spouse on Medicaid 0.034 0.022 0.068
(0.181) (0.146)
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Table C.3 (Continued)
Variables Included Discarded T-Statistics
Child Characteristics
Mean age of children 41.092 32.578 0.880
(9.651) (9.234)
% female children 0.502 0.486 0.047
(0.161) (0.245)
% married children 0.685 0.467 0.522
(0.308) (0.359)
Mean number of grandchildren 1.661 1.195 0.642
(1.077) (1.057)
% children who are stepchildren 0.073 0.131 0.689
(0.169) (0.223)
% children who are in-laws 0.370 0.214 0.211
(0.166) (0.204)
Mean children’s education 13.51 13.173 0.172
(2.186) (1.968)
% children who work 0.805 0.798 0.054
(0.241) (0.261)
% children who live within 10 miles 0.217 0.213 0.153
(0.275) (0.299)
Transfer Policy
Tax-exclusion threshold∗10−4 21.027 22.98 0.273
(2-year period) (14.21) (11.27)
Factors affecting costs of living
House price index (1980Q1=100) 271.28 302.397 0.277
(state-level) (107.89) (126.85)
Gas price (cents per gallon) 108.46 127.46 0.392
(state-level, excluding excise duties) (46.898) (54.172)
Factors affecting costs of formal care
Average daily cost of home care 27.197 26.971 0.012
(state-level) (19.137) (21.895)
Average daily cost of assisted living facility 64.997 85.094 0.756
(state-level) (27.591) (19.03)
Hourly wage of home health aide 15.476 17.811 0.510
(state-level) (4.888) (2.347)
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Table C.3 (Continued)
Variables Included Discarded T-Statistics
Number of home health agencies/ 1000 elderly 0.189 0.426 0.122
(county-level) (0.228) (4.168)
Cost of private nursing home∗10−4 11.132 12.018 0.264
(2-year period, state-level) (3.301) (3.529)
Number of nursing homes/ 1000 elderly 0.397 1.248 0.091
(county-level) (0.383) (20.097)
Number of hospices/ 1000 elderly 0.070 0.148 0.089
(county-level) (0.099) (1.897)
Measures of state generosity
Income Cap/Miller Trust existence 0.181 0.179 0.005
(state-level) (0.385) (0.382)
% income that would be lost if on Medicaid 0.238 0.274 0.114
(NH benefits) (0.310) (0.338)
% income that would be lost if on Medicaid 0.231 0.268 0.118
(HCBS benefits) (0.305) (0.334)
% asset that would be lost if on Medicaid 0.548 0.589 0.288
(for singles) (0.454) (0.448)
% asset that would be lost if on Medicaid 0.423 0.340 0.458
(for married couples) (0.466) (0.452)
% asset loss if spouse qualifies for NH 0.159 0.132 0.247
(0.307) (0.287)
% asset loss if spouse qualifies for HCBS 0.257 0.205 0.329
(0.402) (0.371)
CON laws 0.708 0.701 0.016
(0.447) (0.458)
CON on home health services 0.298 0.294 0.009
(0.457) (0.455)
CON on assisted living facilities 0.267 0.262 0.011
(0.442) (0.439)
CON on long-term care facilities 0.708 0.689 0.042
(0.455) (0.463)
CON on hospice facilities 0.397 0.385 0.025
(0.489) (0.486)
HCBS to NH spending ratio 0.323 0.340 0.049
(0.350) (0.349)
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Table C.3 (Continued)
Variables Included Discarded T-Statistics
Expected benefits if getting HCBS∗10−4 0.002 0.003 0.071
(0.014) (0.014)
Expected benefits if spouse gets HCBS∗10−4 0.0009 0.0004 0.059
(0.009) (0.006)
Expected benefits if in NH∗10−4 0.031 0.041 0.073
(0.132) (0.154)
Expected benefits if spouse in NH∗10−4 0.012 0.006 0.077
(0.081) (0.065)
Factors affecting health
Number of active doctors/ elderly 0.019 0.058 0.085
(county-level) (0.015) (0.997)
% of doctors with medical specialty 0.305 0.311 0.062
(county-level) (0.096) (0.099)
Number of hospitals/ 1000 elderly 0.179 0.139 0.188
(county-level) (0.145) (0.368)
Number of hospital beds/ 1000 elderly 29.294 26.247 0.142
(county-level) (20.504) (24.61)
Number of FTE hospital staff/ hospital∗10−3 0.882 0.939 0.083
(county-level) (0.672) (0.746)
% of FTE hospital staff devoted to NH care 0.024 0.026 0.046
(county-level) (0.049) (0.038)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. HCBS = home and community based services; NH = nursing
home; CON = Certificate of Needs; FTE= full-time equivalent.
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Appendix D
Explanation of Selected Variables
Appendix D explains some variables. First, the savings variable is represented by log
values. I explain how I transform levels of wealth into log values. Second, the variables related
to child characteristics used in estimation are a result of some extrapolation. I compare the
summary statistics of different sets of child-level information that a HRS data user can use
and explain which one I use. Finally, the Miller trust/income cap existence indicator appears
inconsistent across years. I show the breakdown of how the indicator is created.
Table D.1 shows the distibution of savings or bequeathable wealth of the sample by decile.
The second column shows the amount of bequeathable wealth in levels (∗10−4) and the third
column in log values. The minimum and maximum amounts in the third and the fourth column
are in levels. My definition of bequeathable wealth includes debt. Therefore, bequeathable
wealth for a given household can be negative, when their total assets are worth less than the
amount they owe as shown by wealth in the first decile. Instead of using wealth in levels,
with large standard errors, I use log bequeathable wealth and ignore negative wealth, treating
those observations as having zero wealth. The interpretation of my coefficient estimates will
be regarding nonnegative wealth only.
Table D.2 illustrates that the impact of ignoring negative wealth is negligible. It represents
the number of observations with extreme wealth over time. Out of 66159 person-year obser-
vations relevant to the wealth equation, only 1931 observations (2.92%) are being converted
to zero, which I argue to be a small enough percentage to disregard.
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Table D.1: Wealth by Decile
Decile Wealth Level (∗10−4) Log wealth Minimum Level Maximum Level
1st -0.482 1.578 -99.2 0.096
2nd 0.515 8.314 0.0968 1.175
3rd 2.127 9.926 1.18 3.15
4rd 4.509 10.699 3.151 6
5th 7.978 11.276 6.0004 10.036
6th 12.664 11.741 10.04 15.65
7th 19.574 12.177 15.66 24.1
8th 30.577 12.622 24.12 38.2
9th 51.671 13.141 38.22 70
10th 184.51 14.113 70.04 8622.5
Median 10.036 11.516
Table D.2: Number of Observations with Extreme Wealth Level ∗10−4 by Year
Wealth 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Total
Wealth≤ 0 1068 1144 1000 920 573 4705
Wealth<0 405 472 407 402 245 1931
Wealth>1000 10 37 5 14 51 117
Wealth>500 45 73 33 44 90 285
Wealth>100 613 880 722 743 1077 4035
Wealth>50 1592 2130 1868 1909 2559 10058
Wealth>25 3200 4157 3721 3459 4756 19293
Number of observations 13562 15590 13765 12295 10947 66159
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The HRS contains incomplete information on child-level characteristics and I correct for
it. The HRS does not contain information on children-in-law in 1998 and 2000. I use the
available information in 2002, 2004 and 2006 to identify children-in-law whose information is
missing in 1998 and 2000. In particular, if the elderly’s children were married in 1998 or in
2000 and were also married in either 2002, 2004 or 2006, I assume they were married to the
same spouse and merge the information of the spouse(s) that is available in the later years to
the earlier years.
Table D.3 compares the summary statistics of child-related variables that are derived from
three possible sets of child-level information. The first set of summary statistics comes from
when I take the information from the HRS as given and do not correct for the missing informa-
tion on the children-in-law in 1998 and 2000. The second set is when I drop the children-in-law
altogether. The final set is when I correct for (i.e., extrapolate) the missing information on
the children-in-law.
I estimated the model without unobserved heterogeneity using all possible sets of child-level
information and found that, despite the differences in their summary statistics, the coefficient
estimates are similar in sign and significance across all three data sets. I choose to use the
final set of child-level information in the analysis because it provides a more complete picture
of household formation. Data in 2002-2006 clearly suggest that some children-in-law provide
informal care and receive inter vivos transfers from the parents.
Finally, I show in Table D.4 how I arrive at the summary statistics of the Miller trust/income
cap existence indicator across years. The number of observations in each state in each year is
shown with states in italics (and with asterisks) being Miller states. As an example, consider
Florida. The state did not have a Miller trust in place in 1998, had one in 2000-2002 and
abandoned it in 2004-2006. Changes in Florida laws have an impact on the summary statistics
of the sample overall.
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Table D.3: Summary Statistics of Different Sets of Child-level Information
Variables 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Number of adult children
- HRS as given 3.402 3.461 5.745 5.816 5.974
(1.998) (2.006) (3.326) (3.305) (3.348)
- Children-in-law dropped 3.395 3.450 3.477 3.425 3.519
(1.994) (1.998) (1.975) (1.916) (1.961)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 5.746 5.934 5.745 5.816 5.974
(3.509) (3.518) (3.326) (3.305) (3.348)
Mean age of children
- HRS as given 39.21 40.51 41.98 43.53 44.64
(10.067) (9.779) (9.266) (9.053) (8.784)
- Children-in-law dropped 39.21 40.50 41.83 43.53 44.60
(10.066) (9.776) (9.453) (9.235) (8.957)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 39.20 40.54 41.99 43.53 44.64
(9.915) (9.612) (9.266) (9.053) (8.784)
% female children
- HRS as given 0.494 0.495 0.499 0.503 0.502
(0.317) (0.313) (0.155) (0.147) (0.142)
- Children-in-law dropped 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.496 0.494
(0.318) (0.314) (0.311) (0.310) (0.306)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 0.502 0.503 0.499 0.503 0.502
(0.173) (0.157) (0.155) (0.147) (0.142)
% married children
- HRS as given 0.600 0.609 0.688 0.691 0.685
(0.343) (0.338) (0.318) (0.315) (0.311)
- Children-in-law dropped 0.601 0.610 0.621 0.632 0.624
(0.343) (0.339) (0.332) (0.329) (0.325)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 0.680 0.686 0.688 0.691 0.685
(0.307) (0.305) (0.318) (0.315) (0.311)
Mean number of grandchildren
- HRS as given 1.532 1.544 1.681 1.727 1.798
(1.122) (1.107) (1.043) (1.041) (1.023)
- Children-in-law dropped 1.533 1.543 1.680 1.728 1.798
(1.124) (1.107) (1.045) (1.043) (1.026)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 1.603 1.604 1.681 1.727 1.798
(1.106) (1.098) (1.043) (1.041) (1.023)
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Table D.3 (Continued)
Variables 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
% children who are stepchildren
- HRS as given 0.105 0.105 0.071 0.069 0.071
(0.248) (0.245) (0.167) (0.161) (0.160)
- Children-in-law dropped 0.105 0.105 0.108 0.109 0.113
(0.249) (0.245) (0.246) (0.244) (0.246)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 0.074 0.071 0.071 0.069 0.071
(0.174) (0.165) (0.167) (0.161) (0.160)
% children who are children-in-law
- HRS as given 0.001 0.002 0.368 0.388 0.391
(0.022) (0.029) (0.154) (0.147) (0.141)
- Children-in-law dropped 0 0 0 0 0
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 0.359 0.381 0.368 0.388 0.391
(0.181) (0.163) (0.154) (0.147) (0.141)
Mean education of children
- HRS as given 13.485 13.514 13.579 13.638 13.671
(2.133) (2.227) (2.206) (2.162) (2.147)
- Children-in-law dropped 13.484 13.514 13.572 13.625 13.654
(2.137) (2.233) (2.246) (2.224) (2.228)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 13.477 13.536 13.579 13.638 13.671
(2.273) (2.192) (2.206) (2.162) (2.147)
% children who work
- HRS as given 0.819 0.823 0.804 0.804 0.811
(0.276) (0.272) (0.243) (0.236) (0.232)
- Children-in-law dropped 0.820 0.824 0.810 0.810 0.817
(0.276) (0.272) (0.279) (0.275) (0.269)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 0.803 0.809 0.804 0.804 0.811
(0.249) (0.237) (0.243) (0.236) (0.232)
% children who live within 10 miles
- HRS as given 0.264 0.224 0.209 0.213 0.197
(0.316) (0.306) (0.277) (0.275) (0.259)
- Children-in-law dropped 0.265 0.224 0.297 0.310 0.293
(0.317) (0.306) (0.331) (0.335) (0.325)
- Children-in-law extrapolated* 0.198 0.177 0.209 0.213 0.197
(0.263) (0.254) (0.277) (0.275) (0.259)
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Table D.4: Miller Trust Observations by State
State Number of Observations
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
AK 1* 1* 0* 1* 1*
AL 234* 222* 198 186* 173*
AR 368 334* 289* 266 240
AZ 286 272* 263* 234* 213*
CA 1407 1267 1152 1024 899
CO 341* 312* 283* 266* 244*
CT 204 180 157 139 120
DC 26 22 22 18 16
DE 6 7* 7 7* 4*
FL 1784 1571* 1371* 1210 1081
GA 652 572 495 450* 415*
HI 1 1 2 2 2
IA 182 164* 153* 138 123
ID 5 7* 5* 7* 11*
IL 526 453 418 382 342
IN 438 402 355 316 279
KS 77 73 67 63 57
KY 17 22 21 15* 18*
LA 256 229 200 174 149
MA 290 258 240 223 190
MD 303 264 233 207 189
ME 6 5 5 4 3
MI 1058 972 860 768 683
MN 441 409 368 326 295
MO 411 384 346 316 294
MS 251* 227* 198* 178* 169*
MT 1 2 2 3 5
NC 400 363 328 302 280
ND 79 71 68 61 61
NE 218 201 177 169 161
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Table D.4 (Continued)
State Number of Observations
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
NH 153 142 131 114 101
NJ 497 431 364 317 281
NM 16* 16* 17* 17* 17*
NV 26 32* 33* 32* 33*
NY 1055 929 799 691 589
OH 426 389 335 298 257
OK 71 67* 62* 59* 57*
OR 348 319* 288* 262 236
PA 484 439 406 365 328
RI 0 0 0 0 2
SC 159* 137* 116* 115 114*
SD 1* 1* 0* 1* 2*
TN 422 389 349 333 303
TX 981 904* 787* 714 655*
UT 3 3 4 5 6
VA 510 417 351 315 285
VT 5 5 4 4 3
WA 244 231 208 186 176
WI 300 275 251 224 203
WV 306 262 228 209 186
WY 152 122* 97* 89* 78*
Total states with Miller 7 18 16 14 16
Notes: * = Miller state
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Appendix E
Coefficient Estimates with Unobserved
Heterogeneity
Appendix E contains the coefficient estimates of the equations that are estimated jointly.
Note that, in the same system of equations, I also estimate attrition at the end of the period and
the initial condition equations for living arrangements (separately for married and unmarried
households), savings (separately for married and unmarried households), subjective health
status and functional health status. Only permanent unobserved heterogeneity is accounted
for in the initial condition equations. The coefficient estimates for the attrition and the initial
condition equations are not reported as they are irrelevant to the research questions. They are
available upon request nevertheless.
Table E.1-Table E.4 tabulate the coefficient estimates of the per-period outcomes. Table
E.1 and Table E.2 represent the results of interest, showing the coefficient estimates of the
living arrangements for married and unmarried households respectively. Table E.3 shows the
regression results from the savings equations and Table E.4 shows the inter vivos transfer
and bequest intent equations. Note that the independent variables are the same for every
per-period equation, conditional on the marital status.
Table E.5-Table E.7 contain the coefficient estimates of the end-of-period outcomes. They
show the results from the subjective health (which includes death), functional health and
actual bequest equations respectively.
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Table E.3: OLS on Savings
Variables Married Households Unmarried Households
ln(savings) ln(savings)
Endogenous Variables
Good health entering t -0.051** -0.093**
(0.012) (0.025)
Poor health entering t -0.150** -0.174**
(0.027) (0.042)
Moderate disability entering t -0.036** -0.049*
(0.017) (0.030)
Severe disability entering t -0.082** -0.035
(0.032) (0.045)
IL, informal care at t− 1 -0.013 0.042
(0.053) (0.069)
IL, formal care at t− 1 -0.031 -0.026
(0.038) (0.057)
IC, no care at t− 1 -0.074** -0.038
(0.019) (0.037)
IC, informal care at t− 1 -0.046 -0.165**
(0.053) (0.065)
IC, formal care at t− 1 -0.087 -0.099
(0.076) (0.078)
Nursing home at t− 1 0.048 -0.099
(0.104) (0.089)
ln (savings) at t− 1 0.161** 0.128**
(0.004) (0.005)
Personal Characteristics
Annuities∗10−6 -0.479** 0.507
(0.099) (0.479)
Age (years) 0.109** -0.008
(0.045) (0.067)
Female 0.101** -0.212**
(0.014) (0.030)
Nonwhite -0.164** -0.283**
(0.032) (0.033)
Born outside US 0.003 -0.012
(0.025) (0.048)
Education (years) 0.031** 0.055**
(0.002) (0.005)
Number of adult children -0.161** -0.060
(0.024) (0.042)
Spousal Charactertistics
Spouse died in t− 1 0.157**
(0.049)
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Table E.3 (Continued)
Variables Married Households Unmarried Households
ln(savings) ln(savings)
Spouse information missing -0.605**
(0.099)
Spouse age -0.008**
(0.001)
Spouse nonwhite -0.073**
(0.032)
Spouse education 0.047**
(0.002)
Child Charactertics
Mean age of children 0.001 0.0002
(0.001) (0.003)
% female children -0.078** 0.003
(0.038) (0.056)
% married children 0.039 0.022
(0.027) (0.046)
Mean number of grandchildren -0.014** -0.002
(0.007) (0.011)
% children who are stepchildren -0.043 0.271**
(0.037) (0.076)
% children who are children-in-law -0.049 -0.231
(0.103) (0.151)
Mean education of children 0.030** 0.047**
(0.003) (0.006)
% working children -0.007 0.042
(0.031) (0.044)
% children within 10 miles -0.025 0.036
(0.025) (0.051)
Transfer Policy
Transfer tax exclusion∗10−4 0.036** 0.029
(0.006) (0.019)
Costs of Living
House price index∗10−2 0.161** 0.046**
(0.010) (0.019)
Gas price∗10−2 0.029 -0.251**
(0.044) (0.070)
Costs and Availability of Care
Daily home care cost∗10−2 -0.045** -0.076**
(0.019) (0.039)
Daily assisted living cost∗10−2 -0.418** -0.016
(0.049) (0.093)
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Table E.3 (Continued)
Variables Married Households Unmarried Households
ln(savings) ln(savings)
Hourly home aide wage∗10−2 -0.338 -0.542
(0.846) (0.898)
Home care agencies/elderly∗10−3 0.094** 0.169**
(0.033) (0.063)
2-year private NH cost∗10−4 -0.013** -0.013
(0.004) (0.008)
Nursing homes/1000 elderly -0.028 -0.249**
(0.020) (0.043)
Hospices/1000 elderly 0.064 0.102
(0.056) (0.122)
Measures of State Generosity
Miller trust existence 0.032* 0.044
(0.017) (0.033)
% income loss, NH benefits 0.299** 0.357**
(0.059) (0.106)
% income loss, HCBS benefits 0.205** 0.499**
(0.059) (0.107)
% asset loss, singles 0.694** 1.209**
(0.055) (0.044)
% asset loss, couples 0.113*
(0.058)
% asset loss if spouse gets NH 1.272**
(0.025)
% asset loss if spouse gets HCBS -0.008
(0.019)
CON laws 0.242** -0.212
(0.068) (0.151)
CON, home health services -0.007 0.001
(0.023) (0.040)
CON, assisted living facilities -0.122** -0.139**
(0.020) (0.038)
CON, long-term care facilities -0.094 0.245
(0.069) (0.151)
CON, hospices 0.018 -0.089**
(0.019) (0.034)
HCBS to NH spending ratio -0.005 0.076*
(0.021) (0.042)
Expected HCBS benefits, own 2.236** -1.625*
(0.764) (0.872)
Expected HCBS benefits, spouse 0.573
(0.784)
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Table E.3 (Continued)
Variables Married Households Unmarried Households
ln(savings) ln(savings)
Expected NH benefits, own -0.059 -0.062
(0.083) (0.086)
Expected NH benefits, spouse -0.661**
(0.086)
Area Characteristics: Health
MDs/elderly 1.407** 3.234**
(0.593) (0.999)
% MDs with specialty -0.049 -0.302**
(0.069) (0.152)
Hospitals/1000 elderly 0.228** 0.044
(0.062) (0.155)
Hospital beds/100000 elderly -0.217** -0.325**
(0.043) (0.089)
Hospital staff/hospital ∗10−3 0.005 0.009
(0.013) (0.024)
% NH personnel/hospital 0.083 0.310
(0.128) (0.628)
Area Characteristics: Wealth
% Unemployed people -0.019** -0.019**
(0.003) (0.008)
% People below poverty line 1.009** 0.951*
(0.225) (0.530)
Median HH income∗10−4 0.071** 0.037*
(0.009) (0.020)
Constant -3.562** -1.375
(0.982) (1.551)
Notes: ** denotes 5%, * denotes 10% significance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The equation includes age squared/100, age cubed/1000, interaction terms of some personal character-
istics, cohort dummies and trend variables.
The equation is estimated with 3 permanent heterogeneity mass points and 2 time-varying hetereo-
geneity mass points.
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Table E.5: Multinomial Logit on Health at End of t
Variables Good Health Poor Health Death
Endogenous Variables
Good health entering t 1.998** 2.591** 1.858**
(0.019) (0.053) (0.052)
Poor health entering t 2.753** 5.373** 4.202**
(0.077) (0.091) (0.094)
Moderate disability entering t 0.551** 1.135** 0.989**
(0.033) (0.045) (0.052)
Severe disability entering t 0.759** 1.704** 1.746**
(0.079) (0.089) (0.093)
IL, informal care at t 0.063 0.553** 0.412**
(0.069) (0.086) (0.098)
IL, formal care at t 0.231** 0.547** 1.074**
(0.055) (0.071) (0.074)
IC, no care at t 0.037 0.109** 0.181**
(0.025) (0.047) (0.065)
IC, informal care at t 0.059 0.397** 0.584**
(0.076) (0.094) (0.106)
IC, formal care at t 0.243** 0.443** 1.154**
(0.102) (0.122) (0.125)
Nursing home at t 0.117 0.342** 1.417**
(0.115) (0.136) (0.127)
ln(savings) at t -0.028** -0.055** -0.059**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.011)
Personal Characteristics
Annuities∗10−6 -0.473** -0.419 -0.037
(0.224) (0.455) (0.419)
Age (years) -0.088* -0.286** 0.299**
(0.048) (0.067) (0.085)
Female -0.121** -0.259** -0.847**
(0.023) (0.046) (0.059)
Nonwhite 0.202** 0.025 0.036
(0.041) (0.063) (0.077)
Born outside US 0.242** -0.069 -0.136*
(0.042) (0.069) (0.084)
Education (years) -0.048** -0.083** -0.036**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Divorced -0.078 -0.0005 0.198
(0.077) (0.135) (0.166)
Widowed -0.248** -0.409** -0.248*
(0.068) (0.117) (0.135)
Single 0.034 -0.276 -0.089
(0.238) (0.572) (0.556)
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Table E.5 (Continued)
Variables Good Health Poor Health Death
Number of adult children -0.009** -0.018** -0.065**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Spousal Characteristics
Spouse info missing 0.019 -0.075 -0.103
(0.146) (0.229) (0.346)
Spouse age 0.005** 0.004** 0.006**
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.002)
Spouse nonwhite 0.086* 0.155** 0.081
(0.048) (0.075) (0.101)
Spouse education (years) -0.042** -0.050** -0.062**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
Medicaid Eligibility
Medicaid covered 0.049 0.162** 0.202**
(0.050) (0.066) (0.075)
Spouse Medicaid covered -0.044 -0.019 -0.182
(0.065) (0.091) (0.116)
Area Characteristics
MDs/ elderly -3.244** -5.226** -4.473**
(0.977) (1.021) (1.033)
% MDs with specialty 0.074 -0.236 0.022
(0.123) (0.211) (0.275)
Hospitals/1000 elderly 0.328** 0.334* 0.221
(0.100) (0.185) (0.244)
Hospital beds/1000 elderly -0.095 -0.004 -0.013
(0.069) (0.119) (0.156)
Hospital staff/hospital ∗10−3 0.065** 0.053 0.053
(0.021) (0.036) (0.042)
% NH personnel/hospital -0.307 -0.791 -0.954
(0.264) (0.778) (0.712)
Constant 1.544 3.498** -16.667**
(1.038) (1.498) (2.058)
Note: ** denotes 5%, * denotes 10% significance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Reported coefficients are relative to the base category: excellent health.
The equation includes age squared/100, age cubed/1000, interaction terms of some personal character-
istics, cohort dummies and trend variables.
The equation is estimated with 3 permanent heterogeneity mass points and 2 time-varying hetereo-
geneity mass points.
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Table E.6: Multinomial Logit on Disability at End of t
Variables Moderate Disability Severe Disability
Endogenous Variables
Good health entering t 0.718** 0.921**
(0.028) (0.058)
Poor health entering t 1.341** 1.869**
(0.047) (0.073)
Moderate disability entering t 1.947** 2.413**
(0.027) (0.048)
Severe disability entering t 2.710** 4.841**
(0.074) (0.081)
IL, informal care at t 0.607** 0.914**
(0.061) (0.080)
IL, formal care at t 0.349** 0.901**
(0.050) (0.067)
IC, no care at t 0.031 0.009
(0.032) (0.064)
IC, informal care at t 0.578** 0.983**
(0.067) (0.085)
IC, formal care at t 0.452** 0.998**
(0.089) (0.109)
Nursing home at t 0.529** 1.926**
(0.131) (0.137)
ln(savings) at t -0.030** -0.043**
(0.006) (0.008)
Personal Characteristics
Annuities∗10−6 0.533* 0.358
(0.288) (0.914)
Age (years) -0.016 -0.005
(0.055) (0.094)
Female 0.012 0.121**
(0.031) (0.058)
Nonwhite -0.050 -0.007
(0.045) (0.069)
Born outside US -0.215** -0.312**
(0.049) (0.082)
Education (years) -0.018** -0.005
(0.005) (0.007)
Divorced 0.067 -0.153
(0.091) (0.165)
Widowed -0.002 -0.068
(0.075) (0.125)
Single 0.099 -0.217
(0.211) (0.609)
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Table E.6 (Continued)
Variables Moderate Disability Severe Disability
Number of adult children -0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.005)
Spousal Characteristics
Spouse info missing 0.172 -0.161
(0.126) (0.206)
Spouse age 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Spouse nonwhite 0.056 0.057
(0.054) (0.088)
Spouse education (years) -0.006 -0.022**
(0.005) (0.008)
Medicaid Eligibility
Medicaid covered 0.200** 0.292**
(0.047) (0.067)
Spouse Medicaid covered -0.036 -0.141
(0.065) (0.101)
Area Characteristics
MDs/elderly -1.622 -0.074
(0.997) (1.024)
% MDs with specialty -0.050 -0.308
(0.137) (0.229)
Hospitals/1000 elderly 0.187 0.015
(0.117) (0.212)
Hospital beds/1000 elderly 0.069 0.022
(0.084) (0.140)
Hospital staff/hospital ∗10−3 0.041 0.030
(0.025) (0.041)
% NH personnel/hospital -0.420 -0.439
(0.358) (0.928)
Constant -1.625 -3.905*
(1.209) (2.105)
Note: ** denotes 5%, * denotes 10% significance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Reported coefficients are relative to the base category: no disability.
The equation includes age squared/100, age cubed/1000, interaction terms of some personal character-
istics, cohort dummies and trend variables.
The equation is estimated with 3 permanent heterogeneity mass points and 2 time-varying hetereo-
geneity mass points.
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Table E.7: Two-Part Model on Actual Bequest
Variables Leave Bequest ln(Bequest Amount)
Endogenous Variables
Good health entering t 0.072 -0.122
(0.154) (0.568)
Poor health entering t -0.052 0.585
(0.177) (0.659)
Moderate disability entering t 0.154 -0.335
(0.136) (0.458)
Severe disability entering t 0.401** 0.534
(0.166) (0.578)
IL, informal care at t -0.277 0.165
(0.241) (0.820)
IL, formal care at t 0.050 0.228
(0.158) (0.687)
IC, no care at t -0.193 0.744
(0.204) (0.797)
IC, informal care at t -0.045 -0.049
(0.232) (0.786)
IC, formal care at t 0.174 -0.739
(0.218) (0.642)
Nursing home at t -0.717** 0.190
(0.211) (0.657)
ln(savings) at t 0.029 0.005
(0.027) (0.098)
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Table E.7 (Continued)
Variables Leave Bequest ln(Bequest Amount)
Personal Characteristics
Annuities∗10−6 -2.058* 8.540*
(1.116) (4.506)
Age (years) 0.184 -2.259
(0.242) (2.455)
Female 0.532** 0.444
(0.193) (0.585)
Nonwhite -0.049 0.055
(0.226) (0.621)
Born outside US -0.117 -0.151
(0.219) (0.828)
Education (years) 0.025 0.105*
(0.018) (0.056)
Divorced 0.833* 0.885
(0.438) (0.935)
Widowed 0.672** 1.298
(0.324) (0.846)
Single 1.346* 1.908
(0.786) (1.174)
Number of adult children 0.037** -0.108**
(0.015) (0.054)
Spousal Characteristics
Spouse info missing 0.272 0.337
(0.848) (1.042)
Spouse age 0.002 -0.012
(0.004) (0.014)
Spouse nonwhite 0.089 -0.515
(0.410) (0.956)
Spouse education (years) 0.005 0.138*
(0.025) (0.078)
Constant -7.463 79.758
(5.859) (64.330)
Note: ** denotes 5%, * denotes 10% significance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The equation includes age squared/100, age cubed/1000, interaction terms of some personal character-
istics, cohort dummies and trend variables.
The equation is estimated with 3 permanent heterogeneity mass points and 2 time-varying hetereo-
geneity mass points.
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Table E.8: Unobserved Heterogeneity Parameters
Estimated Equations Points of Support
Permanent UH Time-varying UH
1 2 3 1 2
Probability weight 0.073 0.493 0.434 0.076 0.924
Living arrangement, married households
(N = 44769)
- IL, informal care 0 0.404** 0.536** 0 -0.644**
(0.201) (0.174) (0.133)
- IL, formal care 0 0.068 0.102 0 -0.324**
(0.163) (0.151) (0.120)
- IC, no care 0 -0.102 0.068 0 -0.018
(0.119) (0.114) (0.095)
- IC, informal care 0 0.506** 0.774** 0 -0.525**
(0.216) (0.181) (0.141)
- IC, formal care 0 0.255 0.606** 0 -0.117
(0.293) (0.247) (0.193)
- Nursing home 0 0.048 0.376 0 -0.831**
(0.316) (0.271) (0.202)
Living arrangement, unmarried households
(N = 21390)
- IL, informal care 0 -0.059 0.094 0 -0.396**
(0.167) (0.137) (0.106)
- IL, formal care 0 0.063 0.013 0 -0.260**
(0.137) (0.116) (0.091)
- IC, no care 0 0.039 0.219* 0 -0.157*
(0.130) (0.116) (0.091)
- IC, informal care 0 -0.199 0.067 0 -0.336**
(0.188) (0.148) (0.117)
- IC, formal care 0 -0.076 -0.049 0 -0.393**
(0.207) (0.163) (0.126)
- Nursing home 0 0.319 0.419** 0 -1.201**
(0.201) (0.158) (0.118)
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Table E.8 (Continued)
Estimated Equations Points of Support
Permanent UH Time-varying UH
1 2 3 1 2
Log savings, married 0 -0.115** -0.460** 0 9.060**
(N = 44769) (0.036) (0.035) (0.029)
Log savings, unmarried 0 0.551** -0.460** 0 7.971**
(N = 21390) (0.050) (0.041) (0.032)
Any inter vivos transfer, married 0 0.185** -0.149* 0 0.293**
(N = 44769) (0.082) (0.082) (0.059)
Any inter vivos transfer, unmarried 0 0.592** 0.022 0 0.414**
(N = 21390) (0.096) (0.087) (0.073)
Inter vivos transfer amount, married 0 0.091 -0.239** 0 0.043
(N = 44769) (0.082) (0.079) (0.057)
Inter vivos transfer amount, unmarried 0 0.054 -0.436** 0 -0.014
(N = 21390) (0.100) (0.095) (0.083)
Bequest intent 0 2.416** -0.250** 0 0.381**
(N = 66159) (0.066) (0.062) (0.048)
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Table E.8 (Continued)
Estimated Equations Points of Support
Permanent UH Time-varying UH
1 2 3 1 2
Health
(N = 80314)
- Good health 0 -0.096* 0.253** 0 0.187**
(0.056) (0.054) (0.061)
- Poor health 0 -0.489** 0.234** 0 0.295**
(0.086) (0.072) (0.093)
- Death 0 -0.287** 0.235** 0 0.433**
(0.091) (0.081) (0.113)
Disability
(N = 75975)
- Moderate disability 0 -0.123** 0.222** 0 0.041
(0.059) (0.052) (0.064)
- Severe disability 0 -0.549** 0.148** 0 0.214**
(0.087) (0.069) (0.076)
Leave bequest 0 -0.021 -0.053 0 -0.199
(N = 4339) (0.225) (0.189) (0.272)
Actual bequest amount 0 1.361* 0.516 0 -0.322
(N = 346) (0.779) (0.642) (0.975)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The first points of support are normalized to zero. IL =
independent living; IC = intergenerational coresidence; N = sample size.
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Appendix F
Additional Tables: Fit of the Model
Table F.1: Fit of the Model: Living Arrangements of Married Households
Variables Actual No UH UH No UH UH UH
No Update No Update Update Update Attrition
LAt
- % NH 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.79 0.94 0.91
- % IC, formal 1.13 1.20 1.09 1.02 1.13 1.13
- % IC, informal 1.94 1.85 1.93 1.94 1.89 1.88
- % IC, no care 16.19 16.01 16.23 15.42 15.98 15.99
- % IL, formal 4.61 4.58 4.73 4.40 4.60 4.57
- % IL, informal 2.54 2.56 2.65 2.24 2.45 2.47
- % IL, no care 72.66 72.88 72.48 74.19 73.01 73.06
Notes: UH = unobserved heterogeneity; NH = nursing home; IC = intergenerational coresidence; IL =
independent living. I also simulate attrition from the second period onward in the last simulation.
Table F.2: Fit of the Model: Living Arrangements of Unmarried Households
Variables Actual No UH UH No UH UH UH
No Update No Update Update Update Attrition
LAt
- % NH 5.80 5.79 5.51 6.02 5.48 5.31
- % IC, formal 3.77 3.62 3.81 3.53 3.24 3.27
- % IC, informal 5.33 5.64 5.05 5.43 5.19 5.21
- % IC, no care 17.40 17.31 17.71 17.31 17.84 17.95
- % IL, formal 8.08 8.17 8.35 7.20 7.61 7.65
- % IL, informal 5.29 5.31 5.06 4.80 4.76 4.82
- % IL, no care 54.33 54.15 54.50 55.72 55.87 55.79
Notes: UH = unobserved heterogeneity; NH = nursing home; IC = intergenerational coresidence; IL =
independent living. I also simulate attrition from the second period onward in the last simulation.
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Appendix G
T Tests on Marginal Effects
Table G.1: Test Statistics on the Difference between Marginal Effects Test
Variables LA = 0 LA = 1 LA = 2 LA = 3 LA = 4 LA = 5 LA = 6
Married Households
Good health 74.81 0 0 -49.87 0 0 -44.88
Poor health 42.31 -36.29 0 -42.31 0 0 0
Moderate disability 27.09 -58.68 0 0 -74.81 -74.81 0
Severe disability 24.85 -29.92 0 0 -37.40 -37.40 -22.95
Savings -347.85 0 36.29 236.56 94.62 0 157.09
HCBS/NH ratio 0 29.92 0 0 14.96 0 0
HCBS benefits -134.65 0 0 0 0 0 0
NH benefits 21.37 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unmarried Households
Good health 17.24 0 20.68 -34.47 -13.79 0 -15.51
Poor health 8.99 0 18.73 -27.52 -20.68 0 -37.45
Moderate disability 29.55 -18.73 41.37 0 -45.68 29.25 -25.85
Severe disability 17.24 -10.29 45.96 14.77 -12.93 14.77 -76.09
Savings -292.51 87.75 -22.84 0 119.26 46.24 206.83
HCBS/NH ratio 0 0 -3.447 3.447 93.07 51.71 0
HCBS benefits 0 0 0 0 34.47 34.47 -45.68
NH benefits 103.42 103.42 0 0 0 -10.34 -103.42
Notes: I test whether the marginal effects from a model with unobserved heterogeneity are statistically
different from those from a model without unobserved heterogeneity. The marginal effects used are one-
period contemporaneous marginal effects where the endogenous variables are not updated sequentially.
LA-j = living arrangement j
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